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INTRODUCTION 
 
Numerous empiric studies show that the interval between the beginning of financial distress 
and liquidation in the United States is included between 1 and 3 years (this gap is different 
around the world but it exists everywhere). However, many pricing models of corporate 
securities have the assumption that financial distress or default lead to immediate liquidation 
of firm assets.  
These models assume that the liquidation or reorganization occurs when a defined bankruptcy 
trigger is met. This assumption is supported by common covenants, which give the debt-
holders the right to ask for liquidation/reorganization if the firm asset’s value falls below a 
pre-defined threshold.  
I implement a structural model in which liquidation starts only if a time variable exceed a pre-
defined grace period, in order to capture the effects of the time gap between the beginning of 
the financial distress and the moment of liquidation on cumulative default probabilities, 
recovery rate, yield spreads and on the corporate securities value. 
In practice, I build a real option model in which the asset value is exogenous, there are a 
threshold barrier, a grace period and the firm’s capital structure is complex. Indeed, there are 
two types of debts: a junior debt and a senior debt. Both bonds could be Zero Coupon Bond or 
Coupon Bond with maturity equal to 10 years.  
The mechanism of the model take into account (through the presence of a pre-defined grace 
period) the characteristic of the US bankruptcy Code and reproduce the Chapter 7 case (I 
hypothesize that my representative B-rated firm can not continue its business when the asset 
value stay for 1 year below the threshold barrier). 
The contribution of this approach is that I consider the presence of coupons and liquidation 
cost and at the same time the main common funding forms: equity, senior debt and junior 
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debt. Other approach/papers, that consider the existence of the grace period, do not consider 
liquidation cost and hypothesize the presence of a very simple capital structure with equity 
and one Zero Coupon Bond. In addition, I use parameters’ value equal to those found in 
literature and, consequently, I do not apply any type of calibration approach. 
Therefore, I can compare cumulative default probabilities, recovery rate and yield spread 
computed through my approach with those empirically found, in order to understand the 
reliability of my model. At the same time, solving the model numerically, I can make a 
comparative statics and, consequently, I can evaluate how the parameters of the model affect 
the probability of default, the recovery rate, the yield spread and the value of the assets.   
In order to evaluate the reliability of my framework, I use as benchmark the average 
cumulative default frequencies for B-rated debt as function of horizon, as given by  Moody's 
(2011), the recovery rate found by Altman & Kishore (1996), the average yield spread over 
treasury bond of similar maturity for B-rated bonds, as reported by Huang & Huang (2003). 
In Chapter 2, where I present a first version of my model in which I introduce liquidation cost, 
two debts and the grace period, the results that I get are mixed. Indeed, my cumulative default 
probabilities are lower than empirical data, my recovery rate is close to Huang & Huang 
(2003) data, while the recovery rate is almost coincident with the value found empirically. At 
the same time, I show that old models (hit and default) fail. In fact, using these models, I get a 
good approximation of cumulative default probabilities, while the recovery rate is very far 
from empirical value.   
When I introduce coupons in Chapter 3 (and in Appendix A), I obtain results very satisfying, 
since the evolution of my cumulative default probabilities is compliant with empirical default 
probabilities and my recovery rate and my yield spread are almost coincident with those found 
in literature.  I do not achieve the same outcomes if I adapt old models to my framework. 
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Indeed, if I include coupons, liquidation cost and two type of bond in old structure, the results 
are completely different from those empirically computed.  
In summary: I am able to capture some stylized facts (such as cumulative Dps, recovery rate 
and yield spreads); I do that using real ingredients, since I use parameters’ value (volatility, 
risk free rate, dividend yield, grace period, etc.) found in a couple of empirical research; and I 
could assert that the presence of grace period and the introduction of coupons are crucial 
ingredients for matching empirical data. 
 
US Bankruptcy Code 
The procedural aspects of the bankruptcy process are governed by the Federal Rules of 
Bankruptcy Procedure and local rules of each bankruptcy court. The Bankruptcy Code and 
Bankruptcy Rules (and local rules) set forth the formal legal procedures for dealing with the 
debt problems of individuals and businesses. 
Indeed, six basic types of bankruptcy cases are provided for under the Bankruptcy Code, but 
only two of these filings are available to corporations: Chapter 7 and Chapter 11.  
 
Chapter 7  
In Chapter 7, a Court-appointed trustee liquidates the firm’s assets and uses the proceeds to 
pay the holders of claims (creditors) in accordance with the provisions of the Bankruptcy 
Code. Company stops all operations and goes completely out of business. Indeed, some firms 
are so far in debt or have other problems so serious that can not continue their business 
operations. Administrative and legal expenses are paid first, and the remainder goes to 
creditors.  
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Secured creditors will have their collateral returned to them. If the value of the collateral is not 
sufficient to repay them in full, they will be grouped with other unsecured creditors for the rest 
of their claim.  
Bondholders and other unsecured creditors will be notified of the Chapter 7, and should file a 
claim in case there is money left for them to receive a payment.  
Stockholders do not have to be notified of the Chapter 7 case because they generally do not 
receive anything in return for their investment. In the unlikely event that creditors are paid in 
full, stockholders will be notified and given an opportunity to file claims. 
 
Chapter 11  
Chapter 11 is used by corporations that desire to continue operating business and repay 
creditors trough a court-approved plan of reorganization. In this case: 1) the creditor may seek 
an adjustment of debts, either by reducing the debt or by extending the time for repayment, or 
may seek a more comprehensive reorganization; 2) Management continues to run the day-to-
day business operations but all significant business decisions must be approved by a 
bankruptcy court. 
In practice, the steps of this procedure are the following: 
1) Company prepares a plan of reorganization and the U.S. Trustee, the bankruptcy arm of the 
Justice Department will appoint one or more committees to represent the different 
stakeholders in working with the company to develop this plan; 
2) The plan must be accepted by creditors, bondholders and stockholders; 
3) Company prepares a disclosure statement and reorganization plan and files it with the 
court; 
4) SEC (Security and Exchange Commission) reviews the disclosure statement to be sure it is 
complete;     
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5) the bankruptcy court confirms the plan confirmation.   
 
Summary 
When a firm is in bankruptcy there are four primary groups that could influence the future of 
this firm: Managers, Shareholders, unsecured Creditors1 and secured Creditors.  
Usually, Managers, Shareholders and unsecured Creditors prefer reorganization over 
liquidation, while secured Creditors could be harmed by reorganization.  
Whit the 1978 Act, creditors have the possibility to propose their own plan of reorganization 
after managers have had 180 days to suggest their plan. The problem is that each class of 
creditors must be in favour of this plan. In addition, shareholders could vote for this approval 
if their claims are impaired.        
  
Conclusion 
It is demonstrated that old models (or hit and default models), very popular in 1980s and 
1990s, are not able to match the empirical data, even if they are naïf models. Indeed, in a 
couple of research it was used a calibration approach in order to get results similar to 
empirical outcomes. 
In addition, it is verified that in reality default and liquidation are distinct events and the 
default threshold isn’t an absorbing barrier. 
Therefore, I build a more complex and realistic model with less degrees of freedom, in which 
I take into account a grace period in order to study the economic implications of this element.  
Using this approach and adding coupons bonds instead of ZCB, I am able to fit empirical data 
(cumulative default probabilities, recovery rate and yield spreads) without any type of 
                                                 
1 Employees with past wages due and customers with deposits have a priority over other unsecured creditors.  
10 
 
calibration. In fact, I capture these stylized facts with real ingredients, since I choose the 
parameters’ value found in a couple of empirical research.   
I think that is possible to extend this model considering a liquidation state variable that is 
dependent of the severity of distress or different dynamics of risk–free rate or introducing 
other parameters (such as taxes).   
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CHAPTER 1  
 
1. Literature review 
In much of the continuous-time debt pricing literature, it has typically been assumed that 
default is tantamount to liquidation.  
In reality, most of the companies which default go into a period of reorganization and may or 
may not be liquidated.  
Indeed, using US data, Gilson, John, & Lang (1990) investigate the incentives of financially 
distressed firms to restructure their debt privately rather than through formal bankruptcy. In 
their sample of financially distressed companies, about half successfully restructure their debt 
outside of Chapter 11. They find that only about 5% of the bankruptcies in Chapter 11 are 
converted into Chapter 7 liquidations.  
Using data on distressed UK companies, Franks & Sussman (2005) also find that: the typical 
debt structure is close to a corner solution, with the liquidation rights almost entirely 
concentrated in the hands of the main bank; while the banks’ typical response to distress is an 
attempt to rescue the firm (rather than liquidate it automatically), they are very tough in their 
bargaining with the distressed firm; concentrating the liquidation rights helps to resolve co-
ordination failures. 
In addition, numerous empiric studies show that the interval between the beginning of 
financial distress and liquidation in the United States is included between 1 and 3 years (this 
gap is different around the world but it exists everywhere).  
In fact, Covitz, Han & Wilson (2006) find that time in default is significantly related to 
whether the bankruptcy is triggered by litigation, the industry and macroeconomic conditions 
at the time of default, and the change in these conditions over the duration of the default. 
They, in addition, show that there has been a significant decline in the length of time spent in 
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default for US public companies, for approximately 36 months in late 1980s to 12 months 
between 1993 and 2002;  
Thorburn (2000) provides some first, large-sample evidence on the Swedish auction 
bankruptcy system. Compared to U.S. Chapter 11 cases, the small-firm bankruptcy auctions 
examined here are substantially quicker (2.5 months), have lower costs, and avoid deviations 
from absolute priority. Three-quarters of the firms are auctioned as going concerns, which is 
similar to Chapter 11 survival rates. Moreover, based on market values, creditors in going-
concern auctions recover a similar fraction of face value as creditors of much larger firms in 
Chapter 11 reorganizations. The evidence presented suggests that the auction bankruptcy 
system is a surprisingly efficient restructuring mechanism for small firms. 
Recently, some debt pricing models have therefore attempted to separate the notions of default 
and liquidation and/or take into account this time gap between the beginning of the financial 
distress and the moment of liquidation. 
The rest of the chapter is structured as follow. The next paragraph describes real option 
literature. Paragraph 1.2 shows the evolution of the theoretical pricing (structural) models of 
corporate securities from  Black & Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974) to Bruche (2011), that 
are based on different type of liquidation hypothesis. Finally I present some empirical studies 
used to test the reliability of these structural models. 
 
1.1 Real Option Literature 
In the last few decades it has been recorded in the financial markets a significant growth in 
both volume and complexity of the contracts that are traded in the over-the-counter market.  
Black & Scholes (1973) derived a theoretical valuation formula for options based on the 
principle that “it should not be possible to make sure profits by creating portfolios of long and 
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short positions in options and their underlying stocks” if options are correctly priced in the 
market. 
Black & Scholes model is still widely used for options pricing, even though a couple of 
empirical papers have shown that the model does not explain the underlying asset price 
process.       
A large number of models have been proposed to address the empirical weakness of the 
classic Black-Scholes approach. These extended models have been developed though three 
dimensions: univariate diffusion models, Stochastic volatility models and Jump models. 
The univariate diffusion models are models in which it is relaxed the assumption of Geometric 
Brownian motion. In this category are included: the constant elasticity of variance models of  
Cox & Ross (1976) and Cox & Rubinstein (1985); the leverage models of Gesken (1979) &  
Rubinstein (1983); and the implied binomial and trinomial trees models such as Derman & 
Kani (1994) and Dupire (1994). At the beginning univariate diffusion were used in order to 
capture time-varying volatility and the leverage effect in a simple fashion. Then, these models 
were built to match observed cross-sectional option pricing patterns at any instant, in order to 
price over the counter exotic options.   
Stochastic volatility models in which the instantaneous volatility of assets returns evolve 
stochastically over time as a diffusion process (Hull & White, 1987), as a regime switching 
process (in  Naik, 1993) or as jump diffusion process (in Duffie, Pan & Singleton, 2000). The 
advantage of adopting stochastic volatility models is that these models are consistent with the 
stochastic and mean-reverting evolution of implicit standard deviations. 
Jump models relax the diffusion assumption for asset prices such as Merton (1976) and Bates 
(1991). These models were used to match volatility smiles2 and smirks3. 
                                                 
2 A plot of implied volatility vs. strike price will form an U-shaped curve similar to the shape of a smile. 
3 Implied volatility for options at the lower strikes are higher than the implied volatility at higher strikes. 
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Other models have combined features of these three approaches. Stochastic generalizations of 
binomial tree models are surveyed by Skiadopoulos (2000) while the affine class of 
distributional models creates a structure that nests particular specifications of the stochastic 
volatility and jump approaches. 
All these models are more realistic than the Black and Scholes model. However, it is not sure 
if they improve pricing correctness and hedging performance. Indeed, each model relaxes 
several hypothesis of the Black and Scholes model, but the extra risk introduced raises the 
issue of how to price these risk.     
In the 1980s it was very complicated to test the different approaches, because option data were 
not available until the introduction of option trading on centralized exchanges.      
The introduction of some developments such as the Monte Carlo approach of Scott (1987), the 
higher dimensional finite difference approach of Wiggins (1987) and, principally, the Fourier 
inversion approaches of Stein & Stein (1991) and Heston, (1993), have facilitated the 
comparison between alternative option pricing models.    
There are, therefore, a couple of empirical papers that test the performance of option pricing 
model, including Bakshi, Cao & Chen (1997 and 2000), Bates (1996 and 2000) and  Dumas, 
Fleming & Whaley (1998), among others. 
Empirical test are realized in this way: parameters of the model are estimated so that the 
model prices for some european options match the price that are observed in the market at a 
specific time. The resulting model is used to price other options later and then these prices are 
compared with those observed from the market. 
However, Bakshi, Cao & Chen (1997) show that instantaneous option price evolution is not 
fully captured by underlying asset price movements, precluding the riskless hedging predicted 
by univariate diffusion models. 
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Bates (2000) points out that the standard assumption of independent and identically 
distributed returns in jump model implies these models converge towards BS model option 
prices at longer maturities, in contrast to the still pronounced volatility smiles and smirks (or 
reverse skew) at those maturities.  
Bakshi, Cao & Chen (2000) find that adding jumps or stochastic interest rate does not improve 
the unconstrained stochastic volatility model’s assessments of how to hedge option price 
movements. At the same, it is demonstrated that unconstrained stochastic volatility models 
price options better after jumps are added.        
    
1.2 Structural Models literature 
The evolution of the structural models from Black & Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974) to 
Bruche (2011) is presented here. 
 
1.2.1 Default at maturity 
In order to determine the value of corporate securities is essential the modelling of default. 
The classic approach is based on the idea that default is possible in the event that the total 
value of the firm is less than total amount of the debt.  
For the first time, in fact, Black & Scholes (1973) pointed out that equity value is similar to 
the price of European call options, with a strike price equal to the total value of the debt at 
maturity.  
They build a model in which there is a company that had common stock and bonds 
outstanding. In addition, they suppose that: bonds are zero coupon bonds, giving the holder 
the right to a fixed sum of money, if the firm can pay it, with a maturity of 10 years; bonds 
contain no restrictions on the company except a limitation that the company can not pay any 
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dividends; the company plans to sell all assets it holds at the end of 10 years, pay off the bond 
holders if possible, and pay any remaining money to the stockholders. 
In according with this model: the bondholders own the company’s asset, while the 
stockholders have an option for buying the asset back; and the total value of equity at the 
maturity is equal to the maximum between zero and the difference between value of the 
company’s asset minus the face value of the bonds. 
At the same time, Merton (1974) developed a theory for pricing bonds when there is a 
significant probability of default, using the same hypothesis: “On the maturity date T, the firm 
must either pay the promised payment of B (total debt) to the debtholders or else the current 
equity will be valueless”.       
In practice, the value of corporate debt depends on the required rate of return on riskless, the 
various provisions and restrictions contained in the agreement and the probability that the firm 
will be unable to satisfy some or all of the indenture requirements. 
Finally, Galai & Masulis (1976) combine the option pricing model with the capital asset 
pricing model in order to find a more complete model of security pricing. They show that this 
combination of models leads to a number of insights regarding stock risk and changes in 
corporate asset structure and capital structure.  
In these models there is a common assumption that defaults and financial distress bring to 
immediate liquidation of firm assets. 
 
1.2.2 Market Value and distress threshold 
Black & Cox (1976), for the first time, introduced the effects of safety covenants on the value 
and behaviour of the firm securities. In particular, they considered the possibility of 
bankruptcy at any time or rather the hypothesis for which if the firm’s value drops to a 
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specified level, that is variable over time, then the bondholders could force the firm into 
bankruptcy and, consequently, get the ownership of the assets.   
The authors also took into account the subordination of the claims of one class of bondholders 
(junior debt) to those of a second class (senior bond) and treated these two different type of 
assets as two options with different exercise prices.  
Brennan & Schwartz (1978), on the other hand, studied the effects of corporate income taxes 
on the relationship between capital structure and valuation. They showed that the issue of 
additional debt have two effects on the value of the firm and, in particular, it increases the tax 
savings to be enjoyed so long as the firm survives and reduces the probability of the firm’s 
survival for any given period.  
In order to solve the model, they assumed (boundary condition) that the firm files for 
bankruptcy at any time if the value of its assets is less than the par value of outstanding bonds.        
In addition, Mello & Parsons (1992) show how to adapt a contingent claims model to reflect 
the incentive effects of the capital structure and to measure the agency costs of debt. They 
suppose that the value of the firm is an endogenous function of an underlying stochastic 
variable describing the firm’s product market and of the management’s choice of operating 
and investment decisions.  
Also in this model there is the hypothesis that default leads to an immediate liquidation of ths 
firm’s assets. 
In order to compute the Corporate Debt Value and define Optimal Capital Structure, Leland 
(1994) considered two different approaches the case in which bankruptcy is determined 
endogenously; or the case in which debt remains outstanding without time limit unless 
bankruptcy is triggered by the value of the firm's assets falling beneath the principal value of 
debt. This latter situation could be representative of a situation in which there is a long term 
debt with a protective covenant stipulating that the asset value of the firm is bigger than the 
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principal value of the debt; or a continuously renewable line of credit with fixed interest rate 
and fixed amount of borrowing and at each instant the debt will be rolled over if the value of 
the assets is sufficient to repay the loan’s principal (if not there is bankruptcy).  
In this framework, however, Leland assume that the face value of debt remains static through 
time and that if bankruptcy occurs, a fraction 0 < a < 1 of value will be lost to bankruptcy 
costs, leaving debtholders with value (1 - a)*V and stockholders with nothing. 
Longstaff & Schwartz (1995), moreover, for valuing risky corporate debt, developed a model 
that incorporates both default and interest rate risk, allows for deviations from strict absolute 
priority rules if the firm defaults and, as in Black and Cox (1976), includes a threshold value 
K for the firm at which financial distress occurs. If the asset value is greater than K, the firm 
continues to be able to meet its contractual obligations. If the asset value reaches K there is a 
financial distress and some form of corporate restructuring takes place. 
Ericsson & Reneby, (2001) showed that many corporate securities can be viewed as portfolio 
of three basic claims (with simple valuation formulae): a down-and-out call option, a down-
and-out binary option and a unit down-and-in claim. They assumed that default occurs at any 
time prior to maturity if the value of the assets falls below a constant or at debt maturity if the 
value of the assets is smaller than the total amount of debt.  
The second case is redundant when, as in Black and Cox and in Leland, the models are 
characterized by a stationary (perpetual) capital structure.   
Then,  Leland & Toft (1996) develop a model of optimal leverage and risky corporate bond 
prices for arbitrary debt maturity. Bankruptcy is determined endogenously and will depend on 
the maturity of debt as well as its amount. Both value and flow conditions that characterize the 
bankruptcy point are presented. They show that bankruptcy can occur at asset values that may 
be either lower or higher than the principal value of debt. And a cash flow shortfall relative to 
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required debt service payments need not result in default-it may be optimal for equity holders 
to raise further funds to avoid bankruptcy. 
In order to estimate the tax advantage to debt and to determine optimal capital structure 
policy, Goldstein, Ju & Leland (2001) develop a theoretical model that provide a state variable 
which is invariant under capital structure change and account for cash payouts, since payout 
affects the probability of future bankruptcy. 
They suppose, anyway, that the management chooses the bankruptcy level in the best interest 
of the equityholders and that default brings to an immediate liquidation of the asset.   
Finally, Morellec, (2001) investigates the impact of asset liquidity on the values of corporate 
securities and the firm’s financing decisions. The model endogenously determines both the 
default threshold and the sales curve that maximize equity value. Because of the limited 
liability principle, shareholders have the option to default on their obligations. The optimal 
exercise policy for this option is to default when the firm has negative economic net worth. 
 
1.2.3 Not Immediate Liquidation 
Recent theoretical works on capital structure and securities valuation suggest that liquidation 
happens only if the asset’s value are smaller than a particular value (distress threshold) for an 
interval exceeding a pre-defined grace period.  
For example Mella-Barral (1999) assumes that liquidity problems do not have any influence 
on the default point as the debtors can keep on issuing equity to avoid a default. Subsequently 
in his model, default is endogenous and is the point where it is optimal for the debtors to 
irreversibly exchange their current claim for a residual claim which they will get on 
bankruptcy.  
Hege & Merra-Barral (2000) extend Mella-Barral (1999) by taking into account multiple 
creditors.  
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Then,  Fan & Sundaresan (2000) suggest that when the firm is in default, borrowers stop 
making the contractual coupon and start servicing the debt strategically until the firm’s asset 
value goes back above the distress threshold. They show that Bankruptcies are often resolved 
using exchange offers of different types, such as delayed or missed interest or principal 
payments, extension of maturity, debt-equity swap, debt holidays, etc. Essentially all these 
distressed exchanges and delayed payments can be considered for them as a value 
redistribution between equity and debt holders. This assumption is based on Moody's 
Investors Service (1998), where are analyzed all defaults during 1982-1997. This research 
report that about half of long-term public bond defaults resulted in bankruptcy. Of the 
defaults, 43% were accounted for by missed payments and 7% by distressed exchanges.  
François & Morellec (2004), on the other hand, suppose that default can lead either to 
liquidation of the firm’s assets or to renegotiation of the debt contract. In bankruptcy, the firm 
incurs costs of financial distress, and the cash flows it generates are shared among 
claimholders. Moreover, for firms that choose to renegotiate their claims under the court’s 
protection, the default date is the starting point of a period during which the parties involved 
in the process (the claimholders and the court) observe the evolution of the value of the firm’s 
assets. The firm emerges from financial distress if the value of its assets shows signs of 
recovery during the observation period. Otherwise, liquidation is pronounced at the end of the 
period. Shareholders hold a Parisian down-and-out call option on the firm’s assets. That is, 
shareholders have a residual claim on the cash flows generated by the firm’s assets unless the 
value of these assets reaches the default threshold and remains below that threshold for the 
exclusivity period. In practice, they hypothesize that there isn’t any liquidation (fig 1, Case 1), 
if the value of the firm’s assets (V) dips below the threshold (K) and then bounces above this 
value before the conclusion of the grace period (d),. The liquidation occurs only if the value of 
the firm’s asset is below the threshold K for a period bigger than d (fig.1, Case 2).      
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Figure 1 – The liquidation criterion  
 
d d
K
Case 1 Case 2
 
 
Moraux (2004) consider the model developed by François and Morellec and show that under 
this type of liquidation procedure, debtholders may never receive coupons while the firm is 
never liquidated. Indeed, every time the asset’s value goes above the default threshold, the 
“distress clock” is reset to zero. In order to eliminate this problem, He consider the cumulative 
excursion time below the default threshold, or better he assume that liquidation is declared 
when the total time (cumulated) under the threshold is larger than d. 
Finally,  D.Galai, Raviv, & Wiener (2007) developed a model in which liquidation is driven 
by a state variable that accumulates with time and the severity of distress. In particular, in this 
model recent and severe distress events have a larger impact on the decision to liquidate a 
firm’s asset, while old distress events have a slight effect on the liquidation decision because 
the nature of the firm could have been changed in this period. Instead, mild financial distress 
does not lead to immediate liquidation. 
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1.2.4 Renegotiations  
Debtholders, in practice, don’t force to liquidate the firm’s assets immediately when financial 
distress arrives.  
Bebchuk & Chang (1992) and Bebchuk (2002) show that when an insolvent company files for 
reorganization, an “automatic stay” prevents debtholders from seizing assets until a 
reorganization plan is adopted. 
Indeed, for political and social considerations, bankruptcy laws favour firm continuation and, 
in particular, it is possible to have an out-of-court renegotiations or a legal bankruptcy 
protection, like Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code or Concordato Preventivo of the 
Italian legge fallimentare, that authorize to renegotiate outstanding debt.  
In this latter case, the supervising court would convert the bankruptcy proceedings to a 
Chapter 7 (liquidation of the firm’s asset), if there is no agreement on a reorganization plan 
between Debtholders and Equityholders. Before this conversion, it is impossible for 
debtholders to receive any value from the company unless  they agree with the equityholders 
on the division of the firm’s assets. 
 
Out-of-court renegotiations  
For the first time, Anderson & Sundaresan (1996) study the design and valuation of debt 
contracts in a general dynamic setting under uncertainty. Their framework is an extensive 
form game determined by the terms of a debt contract and applicable bankruptcy laws. 
Debtholders and equityholders behave non-cooperatively and the firm’s reorganization 
boundary is determined endogenously. 
Mella-Barral & Perraudin (1997), on the other hand, consider endogenous bankruptcy and 
they model the strategic behaviour of debtors. In their models, the debtors act strategically and 
always try to pay as low a coupon as possible. In good times when the liquidation value of the 
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firm is high, the debtors will not pay lower than the contracted amount as they would realise 
that it would then be in the creditors’ interest to reject their offer and liquidate the firm. 
However, the debtors might underperform the debt contract even if the firm is not 
experiencing any liquidity problems. They will do this when the liquidation value of the firm 
is not sufficiently high and thus when subsequently it would be not in the creditors’ interest to 
reject the offer. Thus in their models, the debtors might default continuously and they will 
continue to do so until the creditors finally reject the offer. At this point the firm will be 
liquidated.  
In Anderson and Sundaresan’s model and Mella-Barral and Perraudin’s model, endogenous 
bankruptcy point will in general be different from the default point. 
Finally, Christensen, Flor, Lando & Miltersen, (2000) consider a dynamic model of the capital 
structure of a firm with callable debt that takes into account that equity holders and debt 
holders have a common interest in restructuring the firm’s capital structure in order to avoid 
bankruptcy costs. Far away from the bankruptcy threat the equity holders use the call feature 
of the debt to replace the existing debt in order to increase the tax advantage to debt. When the 
bankruptcy threat is imminent, the equity holders propose a restructuring of the existing debt 
in order to avoid bankruptcy. This proposal makes both debt holders and equity holders better 
off and re-optimize the firm’s capital structure. Both the lower and upper restructuring 
boundaries are derived endogenously by the equity holders’ incentive compatibility 
constraints. 
 
Renegotiation under Chapter 11 
Franks & Torous (1989) and Longstaff (1990) develop contingent claims models that analyze 
the impact of Chapter 11 on debt values. 
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In particular, Franks & Torous (1989) describe the rights of the debtor-in-possession in 
Chapter 11. Chapter 11 provides the debtor-in-possession with a valuable option, and they 
have shown how that option may be priced into risky debt. Using simulation, the authors have 
compared the risk adjusted rates of interest with the option to enter Chapter 11 with the risk 
adjusted rates without that option. 
Longstaff (1990) derive a closed form expression for the price of calls and puts that are 
extendible by either the option holder or the option writer and show that many types of 
corporate reorganizations, such as Chapter 11 bankruptcy, can be viewed as the exercise of an 
implicit extension privilege.  
In these two papers, the authors model Chapter 11 as the right to extend (once) the maturity 
date of the debt. The longer this extension privilege, the more valuable it is to shareholders 
and hence the larger the credit spread on corporate debt. 
 
1.2.5 Recent Evolution 
Broadie, Chernov & Sundaresan (2007) build a model in which the firm may choose to default 
(Chapter 11) prior to completely destroying the equity value. This decision may still lead to 
liquidation (Chapter 7), or it may result in recovery from default. In order to have this 
framework they introduce two endogenous threshold along with a grace period. The first 
barrier lead to the Chapter 11 filing, and the second barrier determines the liquidation’s 
decision. The company, however, is allowed to stay in Chapter 11 for no more than the 
duration of a grace period d. If the company spends more time than d in default, or if the value 
of unlevered assets reaches the second barrier, then the firm is liquidated and there are 
proportional costs of Liquidation. 
Carr & Wu (2008) assume that there is a default corridor. They suppose that the stock price 
stays above a barrier B > 0 before default, but drops below a lower barrier A < B at default 
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and stays below A thereafter. They have, implicitly, the same dynamics for the asset value 
(V). In practice, in this model Carr and Wu hypothesize that when the default occurs the asset 
value decreases, due to the liquidation cost.      
Naqvi, (2008) develops a continuous time asset pricing model of debt restructuring and values 
equity and debt by taking into account the fact that in practice the default point differs from 
the liquidation point. This separation allows him to delegate the liquidation decision to the 
creditors whilst default is triggered by the managers. The study identifies an agency cost of 
debt whereby the creditors liquidate the firm prematurely relative to the first best threshold. In 
this model default occurs because of liquidity problems and the critical default point is 
determined exogenously. Naqvi assume that debt service is met out of cash flows and that the 
firm cannot issue additional equity or debt to avoid a default. This is not a very stringent 
assumption as it might first appear. In practice, debt covenants frequently restrict the issue of 
additional debt with senior or equal status. Similarly, loan indentures quite often forbid the 
liquidation of firm’s assets by owners as this could potentially undermine collateral values. 
Bruche & Naqvi (2010) develop a model where equityholders decide when to default while 
bondholders choose when to liquidate. In practice, creditors do not liquidate the firm 
immediately upon default and could accept reduced coupon payments. Only in case of 
deterioration of firm’s fundamental, they decide to liquidate. In this framework, the time 
between the default and the liquidation is not related to a particular grace period but is 
completely random.  
Bruche (2011) presents a continuos-time structural model where there is a liquidation of a 
defaulting firms only if debtholders, coordinated or uncoordinated, attempt to enforce claim 
against these firms. In the model, coordinated creditors can have incentives to liquidate 
prematurely, in the sense that firm value would be higher if the firm was liquidated later. 
Uncoordinated creditors care about payoffs in an asset grab game. If legal costs of grabbing 
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assets are low, they can have incentives to grab assets too early. Features of Chapter-7 type 
bankruptcy codes that affect creditor coordination change the payoffs in the asset grab game 
such that grabbing assets becomes less attractive, protecting debtors. This leads to later 
liquidation. The level of debt has, anyway, an effect on when the firm is liquidated, both in the 
case in which creditors are coordinated as well as in the case where creditors are 
uncoordinated. 
 
1.2.6 Comparison with empirical data  
Jones, Mason & Rosenfeld (1984) show that the credit yield spreads predicted by Merton 
(1974) are far below the empirically observed corporate Treasury yield spreads, but a couple 
of authors point out that extensions of the Merton Model within the structural framework that 
incorporate some realistic economic consideration can explain the observed yield spreads.  
Anderson, Sundaresan & Tychon (1996) believe that incorporating strategic default by equity 
holders who try to extract concessions from bond holders can explain why corporate-Treasury 
credit spreads should be high. 
Collin-Dufresne & Goldstein (2001) propose a structural model of default with stochastic 
interest rate. This model is able to show that firms with good credit quality are likely to issue 
more debt, which leads to credit that are comparable to the observed high yield spreads for 
long-maturity bonds issued by such firm. 
Duffie & Lando (2001) study the implications of imperfect information for term structures of 
credit spreads on corporate bonds (short maturity bonds). With imperfect information about 
the firm’s value credit spreads remain bounded away from zero as maturity goes to zero and 
are higher than those generated with perfect information. 
Zhou, (2001) develop a model that incorporates jump risk into the default process. Whit this 
jump risk, a firm could default immediately because of a rapid drop in its value. He show that 
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his model explain a number of empirical regularities regarding default probabilities and 
recovery rates and it is able to match the size of  credit spreads on corporate bonds.  
Cooper & Davydenko (2004) propose a method of extracting expected returns on debt and 
equity from corporate bond spreads. In practice, They propose to predict expected default 
losses on any corporate bond based on its yield spreads, given information on leverage, equity 
volatility and equity risk premia. In line with historical default rates, Cooper and Davydenko 
find that only a small fraction of the spread for highgrade debt is due to expected default loss. 
For lower-grade debt, this component is larger, and their approach provides a method for 
adjusting yields to give expected debt returns. They find that the expected default component 
of the spread varies significantly within ratings categories, so using average figures for ratings 
categories for individual companies may be misleading. 
 
Valuation of the capacity of different structural model to forecast real data 
Many papers evaluates the capacity of structural models to forecast default rates, yield spread 
or cumulative default probabilities. 
Huang and Huang (2003) show that several structural models make quite similar predictions 
on yield spreads if each of the models is calibrated to match historical default loss experience 
data. They conclude that additional factors (illiquidity and taxes) must be important in 
explaining the difference between the empirically-observed yield spreads and the predicted 
spreads. In addition, Huang and Huang point out that for investment grade bonds of all 
maturities, credit risk accounts for only a small fraction of the observed corporate Treasury 
yield spreads, while for junk bonds credit risk accounts for a much larger fraction of the 
observed corporate Treasury yield spreads.  
Then,  Eom, Helwege, & Huang (2004) test five structural models of corporate bond pricing. 
They find that all models have substantial spread prediction errors, but their errors differ 
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sharply in both sign and magnitude. In particular, the average error is a rather poor summary 
of a model’s predictive power, as the dispersion of predicted spreads is quite large. All models 
tend to generate extremely low spreads on bonds that the models consider safe and to generate 
very high spreads on the bonds considered to be very risky.      
Leland (2004), instead, compare structural models’ abilities to predict observed default rates 
on corporate bonds (as reported by Moody’s, 2001). In particular, Leland focus on two sets of 
structural model that have been widely used in academic and practical applications: those with 
“exogenous default boundary” that reflects only the principal value of debt, and those with an 
“endogenous default boundary” where default is chosen by management to maximize equity 
value.  He finds that both the endogenous and exogenous have under-predicted default 
probabilities at shorter time horizons and fits reasonably well the default probabilities, 
especially for longer time horizons.   
The author obtains these results through the calibration of the models and, although this 
exercise provides acceptable levels of volatility, the predicted default probabilities are very 
sensitive to this variable. 
In addition, Teixeria (2007) tests empirically the performance of three structural models of 
corporate bond pricing (Merton, Leland and Fan and Sundaresan). He find that the first two 
models overestimate bond prices, while Fan and Sundaresan model reveals an extremely good 
performance. When considering the prediction of credit spreads, the three models 
underestimate market spreads but, again, Fan and Sundaresan has a better performance.  
Tarashev (2008) use firm-level data in order to evaluate the degree to which five structural 
credit-risk models account for the level and intertemporal evolution of actual default rates. He 
finds that probabilities of default implied by the models tend to match the level of default 
rates. In addition, his models explain a substantial portion of the variability of default rates 
over time.  
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Finally, Schaefer & Strebulaev (2008) study the ability of structural model to predict the 
hedge ratios of corporate bonds against the equity of the underlying firm. They show that even 
the simplest structural model is capable of capturing the extent to which a change in the value 
of corporate assets affect the value of corporate debt.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
30 
 
CHAPTER 2 – A Real Option Model with two ZCBs   
 
2 Brief introduction  
In this chapter, I try to replicate some stylized fact. In particular, I seek to reproduce the trend 
of cumulative default probabilities, recovery rate and yield spread for B-rated firm, building  a 
real option model.  
I start from some classical structural models, but I introduce some elements that are able to 
make more realistic this framework. Specifically, I take into account the difference between 
liquidation and default through a grace period, the presence of more complex capital structure 
(as in reality) and the existence of liquidation cost.  
In addition, I use real ingredients since I use parameter’s value found in a couple of empirical 
papers and, consequently, I do not have any type of calibration approach.  
In the next chapter I will suppose also that one of the bond issued by the firm is a Coupon 
Bond, while in this construction I assume that both Bonds are zero coupon bonds as in a 
couple of classic structural models. 
My framework, therefore, has less degree of freedom (versus old models) and it is 
characterized by an empirical modeling/test of the grace period. 
The results, here, are mixed. Indeed, I am not able to fit the evolution of cumulative default 
probabilities, but I find a recovery rate that is very close to empirical data, while my yield 
spread is  not very far from empirical data.  
I show, however, that also using classical structural model the results are not very satisfying, 
because with these models it is possible to reproduce the trend of cumulative default 
probabilities, but it is impossible to find value of recovery rate and of yield spreads that are 
comparable to those empirically found.      
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It is interesting, finally, to point out that in chapter 3 my results will be really satisfying and, 
therefore, I will show that the combination of the presence of a grace period and of coupons is 
crucial for reaching these results.          
  
2.1 Structural Model  
I build a real option model to estimate the value of various corporate securities (Senior Debt, 
Junior Debt and Equity) under a wide array of bankruptcy procedures. This type of model also 
generates quantitative predictions of default probabilities (or expected default frequencies) for 
bonds. I will use these cumulative Default Probabilities data in order to verity if my results are 
in line with the real data.   
According to the Black & Cox (1976) model, the default event allows the creditor (Senior 
Bondholders in this case) to force immediate liquidation through its safety covenants. In this 
framework, I assume that liquidation is declared when the asset value of the firm falls below 
distress threshold for a period that goes beyond the pre-determined grace time (denoted by d). 
So the firm goes in bankruptcy if, at any time before the debt maturity, the asset value is less 
than a threshold level (K) for a period exceeding d or if the value of the assets falls below the 
Debt Face Value (F) at maturity.  
Therefore, in my model, as in François and Morellec (2002) and Moraux (2002) models, 
default and liquidation are distinct events and the default threshold isn’t an absorbing barrier.  
In this model, as in most of existing structural models, shareholders have a residual claim on 
the cash flows generated by the firm’s assets unless the value of these assets reaches the 
default threshold and remains below that threshold for the grace period.  
The Bondholders receive the debt’s face value if the firm is not prematurely liquidated and the 
asset value at the end of the period (VT) is greater than the debt’s face value. In the event of 
Liquidation or if VT is smaller than the debt’s face value they get the remaining assets of the 
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firm less the eventual liquidation cost, assigned in accordance with the debt’s priority / 
seniority. 
I use standard structural approach assumptions: assets are continuously traded in an arbitrage-
free and complete market with riskless borrowing or lending at a constant rate r. 
 
2.1.1 Model assumptions 
 
2.1.1.1 Asset Value 
As in most of existing structural models, I assume that the firm asset value evolves according 
to a diffusion process with a constant volatility, it doesn’t depend on the capital structure and 
it is described by the following equation: 
 
dVt = (rt – δt) Vt dt + σv Vt dWt ,          (2.1)   
 
where: 
Wt denotes a standard Brownian motion; 
Vt is the firm asset value;  
t represents anytime between 0 and T; 
rt is the riskfree interest rate; 
δt is the rate at which cash is paid out to the firm’s shareholders;  
σv is the volatility of the firm’s asset value process. 
In this framework, the process is a risk neutral process and all parameters are assumed 
constant trough time. 
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2.1.1.2 Debt 
The firm has a total debt F, of which part is senior debt (SD) and the remaining part is junior 
debt (JD): 
 
SD = γ*F                (2.2) 
JD = (1- γ)*F             (2.3) 
where γ is a parameter that measure the percentage of senior debt on total debt 
 
The maturity of the Debt is equal to T and the Senior Debt and the Junior Debt are Zero-
Coupon Bonds. 
 
2.1.1.3 Liquidation Costs 
There are some liquidation costs and these costs are equal to: 
 
LC = ρ*Vt              (2.4) 
where ρ is a parameter that measure liquidation cost 
 
In practice, liquidation costs are a fraction of asset value Vt at the moment of the default.  
I assume that the fraction ρ is constant and, therefore, it is independent from the severity of the 
distress.  
In addition, I suppose that liquidation costs are paid if the default occurs before T and also if 
default occurs at T.  
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2.1.1.4 The threshold level  
In academic and/or in practical applications, as showed above, it has been used models with 
an “exogenous default boundary” or models with an “endogenous default boundary”. 
Consistent with Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) and Leland (2004), my model is an 
“exogenous default boundary”, due that the default boundary depends only upon the principal 
value of debt. Consequently, the threshold level K, which is time independent, is equal to: 
 
K = ω F                            (2.5) 
where 0≤ω ≤1 and this parameter set the level of threshold as fraction of the face value of the 
total debt.  
 
In practice, default boundary depends only on debt Principal F, and therefore it is not affected 
by debt maturity T, firm risk σ, payout rate δ, the riskless rate r or liquidation cost LC.  
Usually, if ω is equal to 1, then the debt is without risk. In my case, this is not true because of 
the presence of the liquidation cost. 
 
2.1.1.5 Random Variables 
In order to determine the value of corporate securities, I define the following random 
variables: 
 
gtk = sup {s≤t | Vt = Kt}           (2.6) 
 
θkt  = inf {t≥0 | t- gtk ≥ d, Vt ≤ Kt }          (2.7) 
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where gtk is the last time before t that the value of the firm’s assets crossed the threshold value 
K, and θkt is the liquidation time, i.e., the first time the value of the firm’s assets spent d units 
of time consecutively below the default threshold. 
When d = 0, default leads to an immediate liquidation and my model is a special case of the 
standard modelling of default and liquidation. 
When d ? ∞, default never leads to liquidation, and my model is a special case of the 
standard modelling of default and renegotiation (as in Anderson and Sundaresan, 1996 or in 
Fan and Sundaresan, 2000). 
 
2.2 The valuation of corporate securities  
In this model, the firm has a market value of the asset equal to Vt, which is financed by Equity 
(St), and a Total Debt (F), which is composed of senior debt (presumably bank debt) and 
junior debt (bond or loans by shareholders). I assume that a percentage gamma of the total 
debt F is senior debt (SD) and a percentage (1-gamma) of the total debt F is junior debt (JD). 
The debt contract gives senior bondholders the right to decide on the liquidation of the firm 
during the period [0,T], only if the asset value of the firm at the time t (Vt) is smaller than K 
(threshold level) for a period bigger than d (the grace period). 
 
2.2.1 Equity Value 
In case of liquidation equityholders, as residual claimants, do not receive anything. If there is 
not liquidation, at debt maturity T, equityholders receive the maximum between zero and the 
difference between the firm’s asset value (VT) and the face value of the total debt (F). Indeed, 
the Equity holders pay-off is represented by this equation: 
 
S(VT , T , gtk) = max (VT  - F, 0)*1{θk> t} =         (2.8) VT – F   if VT > F and θ
k > T 
0          otherwise 
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Where 1{θk> T} is an indicator function equal to 1 if there is not liquidation and, equal to 0 with 
liquidation. 
At any time before the debt maturity, if bankruptcy has not occurred, the value of Equity 
holders claim is given by: 
 
St (Vt , T , gtk) = e-r(T-t) EQt [max (VT  - F, 0)*1{θk> t}]                   (2.9) 
 
Where EQt [.] represents the conditional expectation under risk neutral measure Q, considered 
the information present at time t. 
 
2.2.2 Senior Bond Value 
The value of the senior debt (SD) is equal to:  
1) face value if the firm is not prematurely liquidated, and the asset value of the firm VT is 
greater than the face value of SD plus liquidation cost. 
2) VT – LC if  the firm is not prematurely liquidated, and VT is smaller than the face value of 
SD plus liquidation cost;   
3) face value if the firm is liquidated, and Vt is greater than the face value of SD plus 
liquidation cost;  
4) Vt – LC if the firm is liquidated, and Vt is less than the face value of SD plus liquidation 
cost.  
In summary, I define the possible values of SD, to be: 
 
 
SDt (Vt , T , gtK) =           (2.10) 
 
SD   if VT ≥ SD+LC and θk > T 
VT - LC if VT < SD+LC and θk > T 
SD   if Vt ≥ SD+LC and θk ≤ T 
Vt - LC if Vt < SD+LC and θk ≤ T 
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The expression (7) may be rewritten as: 
 
SDt (Vt , T , gtK) = EQt [SD * e-r(T-t)*1{θk> T} * 1{VT≥ SD + LC}] + EQt [(VT – LC) * e-r(T-t) * 1{θk> T} 
* 1{VT < SD + LC}] + EQt [SD * e-r(θk -t) *1{θk≤ T} * 1{Vt≥ SD + LC}] + EQt [(Vt – LC)* e-r(θk -t) * 1{θk≤ T} 
* 1{Vt < SD + LC}]              (2.11) 
 
where:  
1) 1{θk≤T} is an indicator function equal to 1 if there is liquidation and, equal to 0 without 
liquidation. 
2) 1{VT ≥ SD + LC} is an indicator function equal to 1 if VT is greater than SD + LC, and equal to 
0 otherwise; 
3) 1{VT < SD + LC} is an indicator function equal to 1 if VT is smaller than SD + LC, and equal to 
0 otherwise; 
4) 1{Vt ≥ SD + LC} is an indicator function equal to 1 if Vt is grater than SD + LC, and equal to 0 
otherwise; 
5) 1{Vt < SD + LC} is an indicator function equal to 1 if Vt is smaller than SD + LC, and equal to 0 
otherwise; 
 
2.2.3 Junior Bond Value 
The Value of the junior debt is equal to:  
1) JD if the firm is not prematurely liquidated, and the asset value of the firm VT is bigger than 
the face value of Debt (F); 
2) (VT – SD – LC) if the firm is not prematurely liquidated, and the asset value of the firm VT 
is bigger than the face value of SD plus the liquidation cost but smaller than F;  
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3) 0 if  the firm is not prematurely liquidated, and VT is smaller than the face value of SD plus 
the liquidation cost;  
4) (Vt – SD – LC) if the firm is liquidated, and Vt is bigger than the face value of SD plus the 
liquidation cost;  
5) 0 if  the firm is liquidated, and Vt is smaller than the face value of SD plus the liquidation 
cost.  
In summary, I define the possible values of JD, to be: 
 
 
JDt (Vt , T , gtK) =           (2.11) 
 
 
The expression (9) may be rewritten as: 
 
JDt (Vt , T , gtK) = EQt [JD* e-r(T-t)*1{θk> T}*1{VT≥ F}] + EQt [(VT – SD – LC) * e-r(T-t) * 1{θk> t} * 
1{VT≥ SD + LC}] + EQt [(Vt – SD – LC) * e-r(θk-t) * 1{θk≤ t} * 1{Vt≥ SD + LC}]                (2.12)  
 
Where: 
1) 1{VT ≥ F} is an indicator function equal to 1 if VT is greater than F, and equal to 0 otherwise; 
 
In table 2.1, I summarize the payoffs given to the different stakeholders and reported 
analytically above from (2.8) to (2.12).    
 
 
 
JD    if VT ≥ F and θk > T 
(VT – SD – LC)  if F ≥ VT ≥ SD+LC and θk > T 
0    if VT < SD+LC and θk > T 
(Vt – SD – LC)   if Vt ≥ SD+LC and θk ≤ T 
0   if Vt < SD+LC and θk ≤ T 
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Tab. 2.1 – Payoffs  
 
PAYOFFS TO VT > F and θ
k > T
F ≥ VT ≥ SD+LC and 
θk > T
VT < SD+LC and 
θk > T
F ≥ Vt ≥ SD+LC 
and θk ≤ T
Vt < SD+LC and 
θk ≤ T
EQUITYHOLDERS VT – F 0 0 0 0
SENIOR BONDHOLDERS SD SD VT - LC SD Vt - LC
JUNIOR BONDHOLDERS JD (Vt – SD – LC) 0 (Vt – SD – LC) 0
TOTAL VT VT - LC VT - LC Vt - LC Vt - LC
Bond repayment or Liquidation at the end (T) Liquidation before T
 
 
2.3 Default Probabilities 
The asset value process under real measure, shown in equation 2.1, and the default boundary 
specification allow me to compute default probabilities over the time interval (0,T].  
I highlight that, in my model, the firm goes in bankruptcy if, at any time before the debt 
maturity, the asset value is less than a threshold level (K) for a period exceeding d or if the 
value of the assets falls below the Debt Face Value (F) at maturity. 
Therefore, Default Probabilities are computed including both default at T an default at t < T 
and I assume that any time liquidation costs are paid (according to Leland, 1994). 
Let Pr (t,T] denote the cumulative default probability over the time interval (t,T] calculated 
based on information available at time t. I have: 
 
Pr (t,T] = Pr (Vt, σ, r, Ω)         (2.13) 
 
Where cumulative default probabilities depend on the Value of the Asset, the asset’s volatility, 
the riskfree rate and on Ω that denotes a vector of additional structural parameters present in 
the model such as dividend yield.    
I compare “my” theoretical (internal) default probabilities with the average cumulative default 
frequencies, as given by Moody’s Investors Service (2011), in order to test the reliability of 
my framework. 
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It is interesting to point out, anyway, that default is less likely in the Merton Model than in my 
model while it is more likely in absorbing barrier model, since in Merton model, default never 
occurs before the zero-coupons bond matures at T; and in absorbing barrier model, default 
occurs as soon as the asset Value Vt hit the threshold level K.  
 
2.4 Recovery Rate  
The implied recovery rate, the fraction of original principal value received by bondholders in 
the event of default, is given by: 
 
RR = (1-LC)*Vl / F          (2.14) 
 
I use also this value in order to test the validity of my model. Indeed, it is known that the 
empirical default recovery rate on average is equal to 51 - 52% as reported by Moody’s 
Investors service (2011) and by Altman and Kishore (2006).  
 
2.5 Yield to maturity and Credit Spread 
I am able to compute the yield to maturity and the yield spread of the two different 
obligations, that are present in my model. In particular:   
 
YMSenior = (F*γ/PSD)^(1/(T-t)) - 1        (2.15) 
 
YMJunior = (F*(1-γ)/PJD)^(1/(T-t)) – 1       (2.16) 
 
CSjunior = YMjunior – r          (2.17) 
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I use also this value in order to test the consistency of my framework. Huang and Huang 
(2003), in fact, report the average yield spread (470 bps) over Treasury bond of similar 
maturity for B-rated bonds (junior), based on the Lehman bond index data from 1973 to 1993.    
 
2.6 Numerical implementation 
Since in most cases an analytical solution is not available, I use a Monte-Carlo simulation 
approach, that considers 150,000 sample paths for calculating bond prices, equity value, 
cumulative default probabilities, yield to maturity, credit spreads and recovery rate.  
I  concentrate my analysis on all companies with the same credit rating at given point in time 
(i.e. companies that have credit rating equal to B or BBB), since data on default probabilities 
provided by rating agencies are grouped by rating categories. 
 
2.7 Parameters’ choice  
I assume that firm’s capital structure is constituted by ordinary stock, senior debt and junior 
debt. Both the obligations have a maturity of 10 years and are Zero-Coupon Bonds.  
As shown above, I suppose that the firm has a total debt F, of which (γ)*F is senior debt (SD) 
and (1-γ)*F junior debt (JD) (see formulas 2.2 and 2.3). Specifically, here I suppose that γ is 
equal to 0.5 and, therefore, the total amount of Senior debt and of Junior debt are equal.  
Anyway, in order to study the impact of this parameter on the prices and on the default 
probabilities, I present a sensitivity analysis in paragraph 2.10. 
In particular, I follow some recent papers in my parameter choices. Base case parameters are: 
1) the asset value of the firm at t = 0 is equal to 100 (as Black and Scholes 1973); 
2) the leverage ratio is equal to 0.657, in line with B-rated bonds according to Huang and 
Huang (2003); 
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3) the total debt face value is equal to 65,70%. This depends on the fact that the leverage ratio 
is equal to 0,657 and the firm asset value is equal to 100;  
4) the continuously compounded constant rate is equal to 6% as in Galai, Raviv and Wiener 
(2007); 
5) the pre-defined grace period is 1, in line with the value found by Covitz, Han and Wilson 
(2006); 
6) the volatility of the asset of the firm is 29%, as pointed out in prior work (Strebulaev and 
Schaefer, 2008) for B-rated companies; 
 7) the liquidation cost is equal to 20% of the asset value of the firm at the moment of 
liquidation. This value is consistent with previous findings that bankruptcy costs are about 
10% - 20% of firm value (Andrade & Kaplan, 1998);  
8) the dividend yield is equal to Zero, typical value for B – rated bond (Galai, Raviv and 
Wiener, 2007); 
I set the parameter ω (Threshold's coefficient) equal to 85%. In order to study the impact of 
this parameter on the prices and on the default probabilities, I present a sensitivity analysis in 
paragraph 2.10. It is interesting, anyway, to point out that in Leland (2004) and in Davydenko 
(2007) this parameter (ω) is set equal to 0.7 (more or less) for model without grace period. I 
choose an average between this value and 1, that is the maximum value that ω could reach.  
Finally, I consider 10 periods (each period = 1 yr), and I simulate 150,000 price paths of the 
underlying asset under the risk neutral process for each period. I take 10 periods because, in 
this way, each period corresponds to one of the 10 years of the debt maturity (as in Stohs & 
Mauer, 1996). 
Consequently, if the value of the asset of the firm is smaller than the threshold measure (K) in 
two consecutive periods, then the result is the liquidation of the firm. In the model, however, it 
43 
 
is possible to have the liquidation of the firm even if the final asset value of the firm is less 
than 65.7 (the total debt face value) in t = T = 10.   
In the following table, I summarize the value of parameters: 
   
Tab. 2.2 – Parameters 
 
simulazioni zcb
Parameter Symbol Value Assumed
Time to Maturity T 10
Pre‐defined grace period d 1
Percentage of SD on Total Debt γ 0,5
Default free interest rate r 0,06
Volatility of the asset of the firm σ 0,29
Liquidation Cost LC 0,2
Threshold's parameter ω 0,85
Dividend yield δ 0
Initial Value of Assets V0 100
Leverage Ratio LR 0,657
Debt Face Value F 65,7
Debt Coupon rate i 0
dt=0.01; dt 0,01
paths 150.000  
 
I don’t calibrate my model in order to match perfectly my cumulative Default probabilities 
with the real cumulative default probabilities. I choose to use the “real” (and/or empirical) 
value of the parameters. Following this approach, I could verify the reliability of my 
hypothesis and of my model trying to match my cumulative default probabilities with 
Moody’s cumulative default probabilities. 
 
2.8 Results vs. Empirical data 
In table 2.3, I summarize some results. Here, I highlight that the probability that the Senior 
Bond is fully paid is 86.7%, while for the Junior Bond this probability is equal to 68.7%. 
In the next subparagraph, I present details on cumulative DPs, recovery rate and yield spreads.  
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Liquidation Cost 1,83%
Average V at the default 43,37%
Yield to Maturity Senior 5,7%
Yield to Maturity Junior 9,6%
Yield Spread 3,6%
Cumulative default pr at T 31,3%
Cumulative default pr before T 24,38%
Pr. Senior paid in full 86,68%
Pr. Junior paid in full 68,67%
Recovery Rate 52,80%
Tab. 2.3 – Some results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.8.1 Cumulative DPS 
In order to test my hypothesis, I calculate the cumulative default probabilities present 
implicitly in the model and I compare these data with the cumulative DPs observed in 
literature and computed empirically.  
In particular, I use the average cumulative default frequencies for B-rated debt as function of 
horizon, as given by Moody’s (2011) for the period 1983 – 2010 as my parameter of 
comparison.  
Figure 2.1 – Cumulative default probabilities   
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Matching my data with Moody’s data, it is evident that my DPs are very different from 
empirical data. I believe that it depends on the fact that usually bonds are coupon bonds while 
one of my main hypothesis (as in literature) is that bonds are ZCB.  
In addition, I remind that I set my model on US market, while Moody’s data are global data. 
In particular, it is important to point out that my d (grace period) is equal to 1 as in US, but I 
don’t have any “global” reference. 
 
2.8.2 Recovery Rate 
My average Asset Value in case of default is equal to 43.4%, while the recovery rate (on 
average) is 52.8%. This value is not very different from the value empirically found in 
literature 51% - 52% (as above highlighted). I point out that this outcome is very close to 
empirical data principally thanks to the presence of liquidation cost. 
 
 
2.8.3 Yield Spread 
I find that the yield to maturity for the senior bond is equal to 5.7%, while for the junior bond 
this rate is equal to 9.6%. Therefore, the credit spread for junior bond (3.6%) is smaller than 
the value that is empirically found in literature (4.7%).  
This difference, again, is attributable to the fact that in this framework there are not coupon 
bonds. Indeed, in chapter 3, with the introduction of coupons, I will get results more 
satisfying.  
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2.8.4 Empirical cumulative DPs vs. old models 
 I show below a comparison between the DPs found in my model and these probabilities 
computed using an adaptation of my model in which I assume that: the grace period is equal to 
0.01; there aren’t Liquidation costs; and  there is only one type of Zero Coupon Bond. 
With these hypothesis, indeed, I obtain a particular case (hit and default models) that replicate 
the “old” models present in literature.   
 
Figure 2.2 – Cumulative default probabilities   
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Analyzing the figure 2.2, I could point out that my DPs are smaller than the probabilities 
found with the “old models”. These results, furthermore, are very close to empirical DPs, even 
if the last parallel is not practicable because the empirical data are computed for Coupon 
Bonds and global data. 
This fact become evident if I compare the recovery rate computed through the hit and default 
models with those empirically found. Indeed, the recovery rate calculated empirically is equal 
to 52%, while in the hit and default model this parameter is equal to 83%. 
Even if I consider an hit and default model with LC and two types of Bond, I have the same 
results. Indeed, I get: a recovery rate equal to 67%, that is very different from the empirical 
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value of 52%; and a yield spread equal to 3%, that is very far from the 4.70% reported by the 
Lehman bond index.   
The recovery rate is particularly high versus empirical data and this huge difference is 
dependent on the fact that in these model a firm default as soon as the asset value hit the 
barrier.  
The credit spread is very different from the empirical data, because  in these framework debts 
are always zero coupon bonds. 
It is evident, therefore, that hit and default models (old models) does not fit empirical data, 
since the hypothesis of these models are not in line with the real world. 
 
2.9 Hypothetical country 
If I just change the level of the grace period from 1 to 0.65, I build an hypothetical case in 
which the grace period is more or less equal to the average between US data and Swedish 
data.  
In this way, I try to point out that part of the difference between my results and empirical 
results are dependent on the fact that I use the US reference as level of grace period.  
Indeed, this change produce a moderate variation and, consequently, my cumulative default 
probabilities become closer to empirical default probabilities (see figure 2.3).  
I believe that the distance present between my results and empirical results is not equal to zero 
because in this framework there are not coupons. Indeed, in Chapter 3 I will get results more 
satisfying.                
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Figure 2.3 – Cumulative default probabilities   
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2.10 Sensitivity analysis  
I now consider how my results are sensitive to the choices of my parameters. I start from the 
base case, and then change various parameter choices in order to study the impact of these 
parameters on the asset value, on recovery rate and on cumulative DPs. 
 
2.10.1 Grace period (d) 
In my base case the initial grace period is set equal to one year (as in Covitz, Han and Wilson, 
2006), but it is shown by different authors that under different legal system the average time in 
bankruptcy could be shorter or longer. Thoburn, for example, finds that in Sweden this period 
is much shorter and equal to 2.5 months, while in 1990s in the US the time in bankruptcy was 
longer than in the last years (18 – 24 months versus 12 months). 
Therefore, I present a sensitivity analysis below in order to study the impact of the length of 
the initial grace period on the price of the assets, the recovery rate and the default 
probabilities. 
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An increase of the grace period extends the time in bankruptcy and decreases the capacity of 
the senior bondholders to extract value upon default (cfr. Figure 2.4).  
Indeed, in this case decrease the probability that the senior bonds are fully paid. At the same 
time, go down the cumulative default probabilities (it is more likely that the asset value 
rebound up the threshold level), but the first effect prevail on the second effect.  
Conversely, the Value of the Junior Bond and Equity price go up, due to the decrease of the 
DPs (cfr. Figures 2.4 and 2.5). 
 
Figure 2.4 – Sensitivity analysis: grace period (d)  
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As upon pointed out, when the grace period increases it is less likely the that the senior bonds 
are fully paid. This means, as shown in Figures 2.5 and 2.6, that the Value of Asset (V) at time 
of Default goes down and consequently the liquidation costs and recovery rate decrease 
(remind that the LCs are a percentage of V and that recovery rate is equal to (1-
LC)*V(at_default)/F)).   
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Figure 2.5 – Sensitivity analysis: grace period (d) 
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Figure 2.6 – Sensitivity analysis: grace period (d) 
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2.10.2 Volatility (sigma) 
Figures 2.7 and 2.8 show that the price of the senior bond, liquidation costs and equity price 
increase with asset volatility, while the price of the junior bond steps down.  
The trend of the value of equity is expected. Indeed, if there isn’t a bankruptcy then the value 
of the asset (V) could be very high at the end of the process thanks to higher volatility.  
At the same time, when the volatility of the asset goes up the model records an increase of the 
DPs . This event produces: an increase of the liquidation costs; and a reduction of the value of 
the junior bond, because it is more likely that the junior bondholders aren’t fully paid. 
Consequently they have to sustain more often the liquidation costs.  
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Whereas the value of the senior bond, as above reported, steps up until the volatility is so high 
that the probability that the senior bondholders are fully paid decrease largely (because of the 
liquidation costs trend and DPs’ variations).   
 
Figure 2.7 – Sensitivity analysis: volatility 
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Figure 2.8 – Sensitivity analysis: volatility 
 
64
65,5
67
68,5
70
0,2 0,23 0,26 0,29 0,32 0,35 0,38
pr
ic
e
sigma
Equity
0
2
4
0,2 0,23 0,26 0,29 0,32 0,35 0,38
pr
ic
e
sigma
Liquidation
 
The trend of the recovery rate, finally, depends on the evolution of the liquidation costs and of 
the DPs (cfr. Figures 2.9). 
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Figure 2.9 – Sensitivity analysis: volatility 
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2.10.3 The percentage of Senior Bond on the Total Debt 
It is straightforward (and clear from figure 2.10) that the value of the two different type of 
Bonds depends on gamma (parameter that measure the percentage of the senior bond on the 
total debt) and that the Equity value does not change varying this parameter.      
Also the Liquidation costs and DPs are constant (in this framework). Indeed, one of the main 
hypothesis of the model is that the threshold level depends only on the Total Debt.  
It is interesting, however, to show how change the probability that the senior bond is fully 
paid (cfr. figure 2.11) varying gamma. When gamma is equal to 0.3 (30% of the total debt is 
Senior), this probability is very close to 1, while when gamma is equal to 0.7 this value is 
smaller than 0.75.  
Conversely, the probability that the junior bond is fully paid is independent from the value of 
gamma, because it depends on the DPs (that are constant).  
 
 
 
 
53 
 
Figure 2.10 – Sensitivity analysis: The percentage of Senior Bond on the Total Debt 
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Figure 2.11 – Sensitivity analysis: The percentage of Senior Bond on the Total Debt 
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2.10.4 Dividend yield (delta) 
When a firm pays more dividend, the dynamic of the asset value (Brownian process) is more 
stable (V increases more slowly). It is more likely that the company fails and, therefore, the 
equity price decreases (cfr. Figure 2.13).  
At the same time, the value of the junior bond steps down (figure 2.12), while the value of  
Senior Bond is more or less constant. It depends on the fact that the new process produces a 
decrease (very large) of the probability that junior bondholders is fully paid. Therefore, it is 
more probable that the junior bondholders have to sustain the liquidation costs (and then these 
costs step up).    
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Figure 2.12 – Sensitivity analysis: dividend yield  
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Figure 2.13 – Sensitivity analysis: dividend yield 
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From figure 2.14 it is clear that Recovery Rate, finally, is stable because the growth of the 
liquidation costs and DPs are offset by the fact that the process is less variable (more often 
junior pays for the bankruptcy / default happens in junior’s area). 
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Figure 2.14 – Sensitivity analysis: dividend yield 
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2.10.5 Liquidation Costs  
According to my base case, when there is liquidation, the bondholders (junior bondholders or 
senior bondholders depend on the situation) have to sustain the liquidation cost equal to 20%.   
I show the impact of a different level of  liquidation cost on the bond prices in Figure 2.15 
However, there is no impact on the equity price. In case of liquidation: 1) equityholders do not 
receive anything; 2) they do not have to pay anything due to limited liability.  
The larger price variation hits principally the junior debt price when the liquidation cost 
increases gradually from 0% to 20%.  
Conversely, if the liquidation cost goes up from 20%, the impact is heavier on the price of the 
senior debt. Indeed, when the liquidation cost becomes bigger and bigger, it is most likely 
that: 
Vt  - LC ≤ SD and consequently the senior debtholders have to sustain these costs.  
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Figure 2.15 – Sensitivity analysis: liquidation cost 
 
18
18,5
19
19,5
0 0,1 0,2 0,3
pr
ic
e
LC
Senior
11,5
12
12,5
13
13,5
14
14,5
15
0 0,1 0,2 0,3
pr
ic
e
LC
Junior
 
It is straightforward that Recovery Rate decrease when the Liquidation costs increase (cfr. 
Figure 2.16). Indeed, by construction the Recovery Rate is equal to ((1-LC)*V(at_default)/F) 
and here there are not variation of the DPs. 
 
Figure 2.16 – Sensitivity analysis: liquidation cost  
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2.10.6 Leverage Ratio 
Figure 2.17 provides the evolution of bond values for different level of financial leverage 
ratio. Due to the rise of the Total Debt, there is an increase on the value of the senior and 
junior bonds. In reality, the price of the junior bond goes up until the effect of the total debt’s 
growth is greater than the effect of the increase of the Liquidation costs and of the DPs.       
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Figure 2.17 – Sensitivity analysis: leverage ratio 
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In line with my expectation, equity goes down (cfr. Figure 2.18), considered that the 
shareholders are the residual claimants. Liquidation costs step up, due to the fact that these 
costs are function of: 1) Liquidation Value; 2) Threshold level; 3) Total Debt (F).  
 
Figure 2.18 – Sensitivity analysis: leverage ratio 
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When LR rises then the threshold level is higher and, therefore, it is more likely that Vt could 
below the barrier. This implies that cumulative default probabilities increase with LR (cfr. 
Figure 2.19). 
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Figure 2.19 – Sensitivity analysis: leverage ratio 
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2.10.7 Threshold's parameter (Omega) 
The following figures (2.20 and 2.21) show that the Price of the Senior Bond and the 
Liquidation Costs go up when there is a positive variation of omega (Threshold's parameter). 
This results are in with the expectation because when omega increases the barrier is higher.  
 
Figure 2.20 – Sensitivity analysis: Threshold's parameter 
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It is interesting to highlight from figure 2.20 that the price of the Junior Bond decreases when 
omega passes from 0.7 to 0.9 and then increase. It depends on the fact that the liquidation 
costs’ rise offset the effect related to the barrier’s variation.   
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Cumulative DPs (cfr. Figure 2.22) step up when the threshold barrier is higher and, 
consequently, equity decreases because the equity holders are residual claimants (cfr. Figure 
2.21)   
The recovery rate increases (cfr. Figure 2.22), but the variation is modest because of the 
liquidation costs’ trend. In practice, the evolution of LC offset the benefits linked to an higher 
barrier.   
 
Figure 2.21 – Sensitivity analysis: Threshold's parameter  
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Figure 2.22 – Sensitivity analysis: Threshold's parameter 
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2.10.8 Free-risk Rate (r)  
When the risk-free rate increases, there are two effects: the asset Value (V) appreciates with 
an higher instantaneous intensity and, consequently, the cumulative default probabilities 
decrease; and the discount rate is bigger.  
The second effect is the principal effect on the value of bonds (cfr. Figure 2.23), while the first 
one is prevalent on the Equity value (cfr. Figure 2.24).   
 
Figure 2.23 – Sensitivity analysis: free-risk rate 
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In this case, liquidation costs decline, while recovery rate increase slightly. These trends are 
produced by the Asset Value dynamic and by the fact that cumulative default probabilities go 
down. 
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Figure 2.24 – Sensitivity analysis: free-risk rate 
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Figure 2.25 – Sensitivity analysis: free-risk rate 
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2.11 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I present a model to compute the value of Cumulative Default probabilities, 
Recovery Rate, Yield Spread for B-rated firms and of different corporate securities (equity, 
senior debt and junior debt).  
The model is built on the hypothesis that there are two different type of Bond (Senior and 
Junior) both Zero Coupon Bond and that the senior bondholders have the right to ask for 
liquidation only if the asset value of the firm is less than a pre-defined value (threshold) for an 
interval exceeding the grace period (d). 
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These assumptions make my model more realistic than the hit and default models, in which 
there is just one type of debt , there isn’t liquidation cost and the grace period is equal to one 
day (d = 0.01). 
The first result is that my “internal” cumulative DPs are different from empirical data 
(Moody’s) and it depends principally on the fact that bonds, in reality, are coupon bonds while 
one of my main hypothesis (as in literature) is that bonds are ZCB. Indeed, when in Chapter 3 
I add coupons to my model, I get results very satisfying and very close to empirical data.  
Another element that influence this results is that I set my model on US market, while 
Moody’s data are global data. It is important to point out that my d (grace period) is equal to 1 
as in US, but we don’t have any “global” reference for this parameter. 
I remind, anyway, that if change the value of the grace period from 1 to 0.65 my results get 
closer to empirical data.  
The recovery rate, computed through my framework, is 52.8% (on average). This value, 
however, is very close to the value empirically found in literature 51% - 52%, while my credit 
spread for junior bond (3.6%) is smaller than the value that is empirically found in literature 
(4.7%). 
It is important, anyway, to point out that all results of the sensitivity analysis are in line with 
expectations and with the results historically found in literature.  
At the same time, I verify the reliability of the hit and default models (old models), matching 
the same variables (cumulative DPs and recovery rate) with the empirical data. I get that 
cumulative Dps are very close to empirical DPs, but the recovery rate is equal to 83% while 
the empirically data is 52%. 
This difference is dependent on the fact that the empirical data are computed for Coupon 
Bonds and are relative to global data. 
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Even if I consider an hit and default models with LC and two types of Bond, I have the same 
results. In fact, I get a recovery rate equal to 67%, that is very different from the empirical 
value of 52% and a yield spread equal to 3%, that is very far from the 4.7% reported by the 
Lehman bond index.   
The results of this type of model are, therefore, not very satisfying. Indeed, these models fit 
relatively well cumulative default probabilities, but they are not able to find value of recovery 
rate and of yield spreads in line with those empirically found.      
I conclude, therefore, that: 1) my model works theoretically and it is more realistic than old 
models, but the results are not comparable with the empirical data; 2) hit and default models 
(old models) present some problems, even if cumulative DPs are in line with empirical data.     
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CHAPTER 3 – A Real Option Model with a Junior Coupon Bond  
 
3 Brief Introduction  
In Chapter 2, I built a real option model different from classic structural models because I 
consider a grace period, two type of bonds and liquidation cost. Whit this new approach I 
wanted to fit some empirical data and in particular the trend of cumulative default 
probabilities, the value of the recovery rate and the value of the yield spreads.  
The results were mixed since I was not able to replicate the evolution of cumulative default 
probabilities for B-rated firm.  
Therefore, in this Chapter I introduce another hypothesis that is innovative respect to the 
classical real option model. In practice, I assume that one of the two bonds (the junior bond) is 
a coupon bond.   
The outcomes are very satisfying, since I get cumulative default probabilities, a recovery rate 
and a yield spread very close to empirical data.  
I could assert that: in my construction the presence of two type of bond and of liquidation cost 
have a positive impact on the value of recovery rate and yield spreads; and the presence of 
grace period and the introduction of coupons are crucial ingredients for fitting empirical data.    
Instead, if I adapt the old models, considering two type of bonds and liquidation cost, I get 
results very different from empirical data and this difference does not change if I also 
introduce coupons in this framework.  
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3.1 Structural Model  
In order to make my model more realistic, I change one of the structural model’s main 
hypothesis. In this framework, indeed, I assume that one of two bond is a Coupons Bond. In 
particular, I suppose that the Junior Bond is a Coupons Bond, while the Senior Bond is still a 
Zero Coupon Bond.  
This setting could replicate a real situation in which a firm has bank debt guaranteed and 
rolling (sort of ZCB) and another debt (Bond) with coupons issued on Financial Market.  
The Coupon C is determined such that a time 0, Junior Debt is priced at par: 
 
PJB  = (1 – γ) * F                         (3.1) 
 
Others assumptions are consistent with/to those introduced in Chapter 2. Here, I show again 
these hypothesis for simplicity:   
- the default event allows the creditor (Senior Bondholders) to force immediate liquidation 
through its safety covenants; 
- liquidation is declared when the asset value of the firm falls below distress threshold for a 
period that goes beyond the pre-determined grace time (denoted by d).  
- shareholders have a residual claim on the cash flows generated by the firm’s assets unless 
the value of these assets reaches the default threshold and remains below that threshold for the 
grace period.  
- assets are continuously traded in an arbitrage-free and complete market with riskless 
borrowing or lending at a constant rate r. 
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3.1.1 Model assumptions 
 
3.1.1.1 Asset Value 
I assume again that the firm asset value evolves according to a diffusion process. This process 
has constant volatility, does not depend on the capital structure but, in this case, presents a 
jump because of the coupon payment. In practice, every time there is a coupons’ payment the 
value of Asset VT jump down and the dynamic restart from (VT – C).   
The process is always a risk neutral process and all parameters (rt, δt, σv) are assumed constant 
trough time. 
 
3.1.1.2 Debt 
The firm has a total debt F, of which part is senior debt (SD) and the remaining part is junior 
debt (JD): 
 
SD = γ*F             (3.2) 
 
JD = (1- γ)*F             (3.3) 
where γ is a parameter that measure the percentage of senior debt on total debt    
 
The maturity of the Debt is equal to T and I consider here the case where the Senior Debt is 
ZCB, while the Junior Debt is Coupon Debt. 
 
3.1.1.3 Liquidation Costs  
Liquidation costs are still a fraction of asset value Vt at the moment of the default and are 
equal to: 
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LC = ρ*Vt                   (3.4) 
where ρ is a parameter that measure liquidation cost    
 
3.1.1.4 The threshold level  
My default boundary depends only upon the principal value of debt and it is not affected by 
my parameters and by coupon payments. Therefore, the threshold level K, which is time 
independent, is equal to: 
 
K = ω F                            (3.5) 
where 0≤ω ≤1 and this parameter set the level of threshold  
 
In practice, the threshold level is constant between t and T and there aren’t jumps because of 
the presence of the coupons. 
 
3.1.1.5 Random Variables 
In order to determine the value of corporate securities, I define the same random variables 
introduced in Chapter 2: 
 
gtk = sup {s≤t | Vs = Ks}           (3.6) 
 
θkt  = inf {t≥0 | t- gtk ≥ d, Vt ≤ Kt }          (3.7) 
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where gtk is the last time before t that the value of the firm’s assets crossed the threshold value 
K, and θkt is the liquidation time, i.e., the first time the value of the firm’s assets spent d units 
of time consecutively below the default threshold. 
 
3.2 The valuation of corporate securities  
In this paragraph, I present the new pay-off of firm’s stakeholders. In particular, it is clear that 
the presence of coupons impact on the condition/constrain of my equation.  
It is necessary, however, to point out that in this framework when there is liquidation, junior 
bondholders receive the present value of coupons (Σ Couponst) that include the accrued 
interest.      
 
3.2.1 Equity Value 
In case of liquidation Equity holders, as residual claimants, do not receive anything. If there is 
not liquidation (if VT > F + last coupon), at debt maturity T, Equity holders receive the 
maximum between zero and the difference between the firm’s asset value VT and the face 
value of the total debt (F). The Equity holders pay-off, therefore, is represented by this 
equation: 
 
S(VT , T , gtk) = max (VT  - F, 0)*1{θk> t} =         (3.8) 
 
At any time before the debt maturity, if bankruptcy has not occurred, the value of Equity 
holders claim is given by: 
 
St (Vt , T , gtk) = e-r(T-t) EQt [max (VT  - F, 0)*1{θk> t}]        (3.9) 
 
VT – F    if VT > F + Coupon and θk > T 
0            otherwise 
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3.2.2 Senior Debt 
The value of the senior debt (SD) is equal to:  
1) face value if the firm is not prematurely liquidated, and the asset value of the firm VT is 
greater than the face value of Debt plus the last coupon; 
2) face value if the firm is not prematurely liquidated, and the asset value of the firm VT is 
smaller than the face value of Debt plus last coupon but greater than the face value of Debt 
plus liquidation cost; 
3) VT – LC if  the firm is not prematurely liquidated, and VT is smaller than the face value of 
SD plus liquidation cost; 
4) face value if the firm is prematurely liquidated, and Vt is greater than the face value of SD 
plus liquidation cost; 
5) Vt – LC if the firm is liquidated, and Vt is less than the face value of SD plus liquidation 
cost.  
In summary, I define the possible values of SD, to be: 
 
 
SDt (Vt , T , gtK) =           (3.10) 
 
 
The expression (3.10) may be rewritten as: 
 
SDt (Vt,T,gtK) = EQt[SD*e-r(T-t)*1{θk>T}*1{VT≥F}]+EQt [SD*e-r(T-t)*1{θk>T}*1{VT<F+c}*1{VT≥ SD+LC} 
+EQt[(VT - LC)*e-r(T-t)*1{θk>T}*1{VT<F+coup}*1{VT < SD+LC}]+Eqt [SD*e-r(θk -t)*1{θk≤ T}*1{Vt ≥ SD+LC }] 
+EQt [(Vt – LC)*e-r(θk -t)*1{θk≤ T}*1{Vt < SD+LC }]       (3.11)                  
 
SD   if VT ≥ F + coupon and θk > T 
SD  if VT < F + coupon, VT ≥ SD + LC and θk > T 
VT - LC  if VT < F + coupon, VT < SD + LC and θk > T  
SD   if Vt ≥ SD + LC and θk ≤ T 
Vt - LC if Vt < SD + LC and θk ≤ T
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where:  
1) 1{VT<F+c} is an indicator function equal to 1 if VT is smaller than F + last coupon, and equal 
to 0 otherwise;  
 
3.2.3 Junior Debt 
The Value of the junior debt is equal to:  
1) face value plus PVC (present Value of Coupons) if the firm is not prematurely liquidated, 
and the asset value of the firm VT is bigger than the face value of SD plus the last coupon;  
2) (VT – SD – LC + PVC – last coupon) if the firm is not prematurely liquidated, and VT is 
smaller than the face value of Debt but greater than the face value of SD plus liquidation 
cost;  
3) PVC minus the last coupon if the firm is not prematurely liquidated, and VT is smaller than 
the face value of SD plus liquidation cost 
4) (Vt – SD – LC + Σ Couponst) if the firm is liquidated, and Vt is bigger than the face value 
of SD plus the liquidation cost;  
5) Σ Couponst  if the firm is liquidated, and Vt is smaller than the face value of SD plus the 
liquidation cost.  
In summary, I define the possible values of JD, to be: 
 
 
JDt (Vt , T , gtK) =                 
 
 
 
 
JD + PVC        if VT≥F+coupon and θk > T 
(VT – SD – LC + PVC – coup.)  if VT<F+coupon, VT≥SD+LC and θk>T 
PVC – coupon        if VT<F+coupon, VT<SD+LC and θk>T    (3.12) 
(Vt – SD – LC + Σ Couponst)     if Vt ≥ SD + LC and θk ≤ T 
Σ Couponst                                                  if Vt < SD + LC and θk ≤ T 
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The expression (3.12) may be rewritten as: 
 
JDt(Vt,T,gtK) = EQt[((JD)*e-r(T-t)+PVC)*1{θk> T}*1{VT≥ F+c}+EQt[(((VT–SD–LC–coupon)*e-r(T-t)) 
+ PVC)*1{θk> T}*1{VT< F+c}*1{VT ≥ SD+LC}]+EQt[((coupon)*e-r(T-t)+PVC)1{θk≤ T}*1{VT< F+c}*1{VT< 
SD+LC}]+EQt[(Vt – SD – LC + Σ Couponst)*e-r(θk-t)*1{θk≤ T} *1{Vt ≥ SD+LC}]+EQt[(Σ Couponst)*e-
r(θk-t)*1{θk≤ T} *1{Vt < SD+LC}          (3.13) 
  
where:  
1) 1{VT≥F+c} is an indicator function equal to 1 if VT is smaller than F + last coupon, and equal 
to 0 otherwise; 
In table 3.1, I report the payoffs given to the different stakeholders.    
 
 Tab. 3.1 – Payoffs  
 
PAYOFFS TO
VT ≥ F + Coupon 
and θk > T
VT < F + Coupon, VT ≥ SD+LC 
and θk > T
VT < F + Coupon, VT < SD+LC 
and θk > T
F ≥ Vt ≥ SD+LC and θk ≤ T Vt < SD+LC and θk ≤ T
EQUITYHOLDERS VT – F 0 0 0 0
SENIOR BONDHOLDERS SD SD VT - LC SD Vt - LC
JUNIOR BONDHOLDERS JD + PVC (VT – SD – LC + PVC - couponT) PVC - couponT (Vt – SD – LC + Σ Couponst) Σ Couponst
TOTAL VT + PVC (VT - LC) + (PVC -couponT) (VT - LC) + (PVC -couponT) Vt - LC + Σ Couponst Vt - LC + Σ Couponst
Liquidation before TBond repayment or Liquidation at the end (T)
 
 
3.3 Benchmark  
Also, in this case, I am able to compute: default probabilities over the time interval (0,T]; the 
implied recovery rate RR = (1-LC)*Vl / F; the yield to maturity and the yield spread of the two 
different obligations. I use this value in order to test the consistency of my model.  
The outcomes, as pointed out below, are very satisfying. Indeed, I get a recovery rate and a 
yield spread in line with those empirically found and a trend of cumulative default 
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probabilities very similar to empirical cumulative DPs with a perfect coincidence at the end of 
the process (at T = 10 years). 
In addition, my results are better than those found using an adaption of old models (hit and 
default models).       
  
3.4 Numerical implementation 
I use, again, a Monte-Carlo simulation approach that considers 150,000 sample paths for 
calculating bond prices, equity value, cumulative default probabilities, and recovery rate. The 
solution found are stable up to the second digit.  
 
3.5 Parameters’ choice 
I assume that firm’s capital structure is constituted by ordinary stock, senior debt and junior 
debt. Both the obligations have a maturity of 10 years. Junior Debt is a Coupon Bond, while 
Senior Debt is a Zero Coupon Bond. 
I utilize the same real value used in Chapter 2 for the parameters present in the Model. The 
two main differences are: the Coupon C is determined such that a time 0, Junior Debt is priced 
at par; and every time there is a coupons’ payment the value of Asset VT jump down and the 
dynamic restart from (VT – C). 
In tables 3.2, I summarize the parameters choice: 
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Tab. 3.2 – Parameters 
 
Parameter Symbol Value Assumed
Time to Maturity T 10
Pre‐defined grace period d 1
Percentage of SD on Total Debt γ 0,5
Default free interest rate r 0,06
Volatility of the asset of the firm σ 0,29
Liquidation Cost LC 0,2
Threshold's parameter ω 0,85
Dividend yield δ 0
Initial Value of Assets V0 100
Leverage Ratio LR 0,657
Debt Face Value F 65,7
Debt Coupon rate i 0,1078
dt=0.01; dt 0,01
paths 150.000                
 
3.6 Results  
Some results are reported in table 3.3, while considerations about cumulative DPs, recovery 
rate and yield spreads are presented in the next sections.  
However, I point out, here, that the probability that the Senior Bond is fully paid is 76.9%, 
while for the Junior Bond this probability is equal to 53.28%. Also, in this framework, the 
Junior Bondholders pay more often the liquidation cost. 
 
Tab. 3.3 – Some results  
 
Liquidation Cost 2,65%
Average V at the default 41,95%
Yield Senior 5,49%
Yield Junior 11,07%
Cumulative default pr at T 46,72%
Cumulative default pr before T 38,13%
Pr. Senior paid in full 76,90%
Pr. Junior paid in full 53,28%
Recovery Rate 51,08%  
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3.6.1 Cumulative DPS 
In order to test my hypothesis, I calculate the cumulative default probabilities present 
implicitly in the model and I compare these data with the cumulative DPs observed in 
literature (Moody’s 2011).  
Matching my data with Moody’s data, it is evident that my DPs are really close to empirical 
data and that at the end (at T =10 years) these probabilities are coincident.  
The introduction of coupons is a crucial assumption. Indeed, my results have an impressive 
improvement when I introduce this hypothesis. 
The light difference depends on the fact that I set my model on US market, while Moody’s 
data are global data. In particular, it is important to point out that my d (grace period) is equal 
to 1 as in US, but we don’t have any “global” reference. 
 
Figure 3.1 – Cumulative default probabilities  
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3.6.2 Recovery Rate 
The average Asset Value in case of default is equal to 41.95%, while the recovery rate (on 
average) is 51.05%. This value is in line with the value empirically found in literature 51% - 
52% (as above highlighted).  
The presence of coupon and the consequent growth of DPs produce a reduction of my 
recovery rate versus those found in chapter 2.  
 
3.6.3 Yield Spread 
I find that the yield to maturity for the senior bond is equal to 5.49%, while for the junior bond 
this rate is equal to 11.07%.  
Therefore, the credit spread for junior bond (5.07%) is very close to the value that is 
empirically found in literature (4.7%). 
In practice, the values (for recovery rate and yield spreads) that I found implicitly from my 
model are equal to the values found in a couple of empirical research (Huang and Huang, 
2003 and Altman and Kishore, 2006 etc.) and I get this value without any type of calibration.   
 
3.6.4 Empirical cumulative DPs vs. old models 
 I show below a graph where: 
- The blue line represents my results; 
-  The violet line represents the DPs computed through an adaption of my model in which I 
assume that the grace period is equal to 0.01 (such as in old models) and that there aren’t 
Liquidation costs; 
- The red line represents empirical data. 
 
 
76 
 
Figure 3.2 – Cumulative default probabilities   
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Analyzing this figure, I could point out that the adaption of old models (g = 0.01 with two 
type of bonds, of which one Junior with coupons) give back results very different from 
Moody’s data.  
In practice, if I consider an adaption of old models with two type of debt and coupons, I get 
results very far from empirical data. This means that the presence of grace period represent the 
crucial assumption that allow me to match empirical data. 
This fact is confirmed if I compare the recovery rate and yield spread computed through the 
hit and default model with those empirically found. Indeed, the recovery rate calculated 
empirically is equal to 52%, while in the hit and default model this parameter is equal to 
83.8%; and the yield spread equal to 3.6% is far from the 4.70% reported by the Lehman bond 
index.   
Even if I consider an hit and default models (old models) with LC, I have the same results. In 
fact, I get a recovery rate equal to 67.5%, that is still very different from the empirical value of 
52%. 
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I could, therefore, assert that old models are not able to represent real world. Indeed, I showed 
in chapter 2 that without coupons these models do not fit recovery rate and yield spreads and, 
in addition, I highlight in this chapter that, if I include coupons, the main results do not change 
and on the contrary cumulative DPs become very different from empirical data. 
 
3.7 Hypothetical country 
Here, I present a variation of my model, in which I change just one variable and the coupon 
rate. In practice, in this particular setting I consider a grace period g = 0.65 (versus 1.0 in the 
base case) and, in addition, I vary the coupon rate in order to satisfy the hypothesis that the 
junior debt is priced at par.  
Again, I choose the new level of the grace period equal to (more or less) the average between 
US data (1 year) and Swedish data (2.5 months). 
The outcomes are very satisfying due that new results match really well the empirical data.  
This confirm that the difference between my data and empirical data is due mainly to the fact 
that my model is built on US data while empirical data (cumulative default probabilities) are 
global.   
Indeed, it is important to remind that I don’t have the global value for grace period, but I know 
that is equal to 1 in US. 
I explain the light difference present at the end of the period between my data and real data 
such as a difference dependent on the fact that in my model it in not possible to renew the debt 
at the expiration date, while in the real world it is very likely to roll over the debt. 
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Figure 3.3 – Cumulative default probabilities  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.8 Sensitivity analysis  
I now consider how my results are sensitive to the choices of my parameters. I start from the 
base case, and then change various parameter choices in order to study the impact of these 
parameters on the asset value, recovery rate and cumulative DPs. 
 
3.8.1 Grace period (g) 
Here, I present a sensitivity analysis in order to study the impact of the length of the initial 
grace period on the price of the assets, the recovery rate and the default probabilities. 
I remind that an increase of the grace period extends the time in bankruptcy and decreases the 
capacity of the senior bondholders to extract value upon default (cfr. Figure 3.4).  
Indeed, in this case: 1) the probability that the senior bonds are fully paid decrease; 2) 
cumulative default probabilities go down (it is more likely that the asset value rebound up the 
threshold level; 3) the first effect prevail on the second effect.  
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Conversely, the Value of the Junior Bond (cfr. Figure 3.4) and Equity price (cfr. Figure 3.5) 
go up, because of the decrease of cumulative DPs. 
 
Figure 3.4 – Sensitivity analysis: grace period 
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It is less likely the that the senior bonds are fully paid. This means that the Value of Asset (V) 
at the Default goes down and consequently (cfr. Figures 3.5 and 3.6) the liquidation costs and 
recovery rate decrease (remind that the LCs are a percentage of V and that recovery rate is 
equal to (1-LC)*V(at_default)/F)).   
 
Figure 3.5 – Sensitivity analysis: grace period 
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Figure 3.6 – Sensitivity analysis: grace period 
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3.8.2 Volatility (sigma) 
From Figure 3.8 it is evident that liquidation costs and equity price increase when asset 
volatility goes up, while from Figure 3.7 it is clear that the price of the junior bond steps 
down.  
The trend of the value of equity is expected. Indeed, if there is not a bankruptcy then the value 
of the asset (V) could be very high at the end of the process.  
At the same time, when the volatility of the asset goes up the model records an increase of the 
DPs. This event produces an increase of liquidation costs and a reduction of the value of the 
junior bond. It is more likely that the junior bondholders are not fully paid and consequently 
they have to sustain more often the liquidation costs.  
Whereas the value of the senior bond (cfr. Figure 3.7) steps up until the volatility is equal to 
0.29. From that point, the probability that the senior bondholders are paid in full decrease 
largely and consequently the value of this type of debt starts to decrease.   
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Figure 3.7 – Sensitivity analysis: volatility 
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Figure 3.8 – Sensitivity analysis: volatility 
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The trend of the recovery rate, finally, depends on the evolution of: 1) liquidation costs; 2) 
cumulative DPs. 
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Figure 3.9 – Sensitivity analysis: volatility 
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3.8.3 The percentage of Senior Bond on the Total Debt 
It is straightforward that the value of the two different type of Bond depends on the percentage 
gamma of senior bond on the total debt.  
Equity value goes up when the value of gamma increase (cfr. Figure 3.11). This pattern is 
dependent on the fact that the equityholders as residual claimants benefit from the reduction of 
coupons payment. Because of this reduction, cumulative default probabilities4 and Liquidation 
costs go down while recovery rate increase slowly (cfr. Figures 3.11 and 3.12).  
 
Figure 3.10 – Sensitivity analysis: The percentage of Senior Bond on the Total Debt 
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4 In this framework when I change gamma, cumulative DPs are not constant as in Chapter 2.   
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Figure 3.11 – Sensitivity analysis: The percentage of Senior Bond on the Total Debt 
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Figure 3.12 – Sensitivity analysis: The percentage of Senior Bond on the Total Debt 
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3.8.4 Dividend yield (delta) 
When a firm pays more dividend, the dynamic of the asset value (Brownian process) is more 
stable (V increases more slowly). It is more likely that the company fails and, therefore, the 
equity price decreases and Liquidation costs increase (cfr. Figure 3.14).  
At the same time, the price of  Senior Bond goes up, while the price of the junior bond steps 
down (cfr. Figure 3.13). It depends on the fact that the new process produces a decrease (very 
large) of the probability that junior bondholders is fully paid. Therefore, it is more likely that 
the junior bondholders have to sustain the liquidation costs (and then these costs step up).    
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The evolution of the value of the senior bond derives from the trend of cumulative default 
probabilities above specified and from the fact that the Value at the default that is constant 
thanks to the stability of the process. 
 
Figure 3.13 – Sensitivity analysis: dividend yield 
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Figure 3.14 – Sensitivity analysis: dividend yield 
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Recovery Rate is very stable, because the growth of the liquidation costs and DPs are offset by 
the fact that the process is less variable (cfr. Figure 3.15). 
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Figure 3.15 – Sensitivity analysis: dividend yield 
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3.8.5 Liquidation Costs  
When there is liquidation, junior bondholders or senior bondholders have to sustain the 
liquidation cost. Therefore, the impact of variation in liquidation cost influence only the value 
of these two assets.   
Here, as in Chapter 2, indeed, there is no impact on the equity price. In case of liquidation the 
equityholders don’t receive anything and, at the same time, they don’t have to pay anything 
due to limited liability.  
From Figure 3.16 it is clear that Junior debt price is more affected by the variation of 
liquidation cost when this parameter increases gradually from 0% to 20%.  
Conversely, if the liquidation cost goes up from 20% to 30%, the impact is heavier on the 
price of the senior debt. Indeed, when the liquidation cost becomes bigger and bigger, it is 
more likely that: 
Vt  - LC ≤ SD (the senior debtholders have to sustain these costs).  
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Figure 3.16 – Sensitivity analysis: liquidation cost  
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Recovery Rate, on the other hand, decrease when the Liquidation costs increase. Indeed, 
Recovery Rate is equal to ((1-LC)*V(at_default)/F).  
Finally, there are not variation of the cumulative Default Probabilities, because there is 
liquidation when the firm is already on default. 
 
Figure 3.17 – Sensitivity analysis: liquidation cost  
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3.8.6 Leverage Ratio 
When there is an increase of the value of the Total Debt, the price of the senior and junior 
bonds rise proportionally (cfr. Figure 3.18).  
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Clearly, the price of the junior bond goes up until the effect of the total debt’s growth is offset 
by the increase of the Liquidation costs and of the cumulative Default Probabilities.       
 
Figure 3.18 – Sensitivity analysis: leverage ratio 
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I find, as expected, that the equity price goes down (cfr. Figure 3.19), while the cumulative 
Default Probabilities increase (cfr. Figure 3.20). In fact, when a firm has more debt, it is easier 
to have default. 
 
Figure 3.19– Sensitivity analysis: leverage ratio  
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Figure 3.20 – Sensitivity analysis: leverage ratio 
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3.8.7 Threshold's parameter (Omega) 
The Price of the Senior Bond (cfr. Figure 3.21) and the Liquidation Costs (cfr. Figure 3.22) go 
up when there is a positive variation of omega (Threshold's parameter). This results depend on 
the fact that when omega increases the barrier is higher. The Junior Bond (cfr. Figure 3.21), 
conversely, decreases when omega passes from 0.7 to 1 because liquidation costs’ rise offset 
the benefit deriving from the barrier’s variation.   
 
Figure 3.21 – Sensitivity analysis: Threshold's parameter 
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The DPs (cfr. Figure 3.23) step up when the threshold barrier is higher and consequently the 
value of equity goes down (cfr. Figure 3.22).   
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From Figure 3.23 it also clear that the recovery rate, on the other hand, increases but the 
variation is modest because of the liquidation costs’ trend. 
 
Figure 3.22 – Sensitivity analysis: Threshold's parameter 
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Figure 3.23 – Sensitivity analysis: Threshold's parameter 
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3.8.8 Free-risk Rate (r)  
When the risk-free rate increases, there are two effects: the asset Value (V) appreciates with 
an higher instantaneous intensity and, consequently, the cumulative default probabilities 
decrease; and the discount rate became bigger and bigger.  
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The second effect is the principal effect on the value of bonds, as shown in figure 3.24, while 
the first one is prevalent on the Equity value (cfr. Figure 3.25).   
 
Figure 3.24 – Sensitivity analysis: Free-risk Rate 
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Liquidation costs decline, given that the cumulative default probabilities go down, while and 
recovery rate increase slightly thanks to the Asset Value dynamic (cfr. Figure 3.26).  
 
Figure 3.25 – Sensitivity analysis: Free-risk Rate 
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Figure 3.26 – Sensitivity analysis: Free-risk Rate 
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3.9 Conclusion 
In this chapter I present an evolution of the model built in Chapter 2. In particular, I suppose 
that one of the two type of debt is a coupon bond (junior debt).  
With this change, I try to match better empirical data (Recovery Rate, Yield Spread and 
Cumulative Default probabilities) for B-rated firms.  
The two main differences between this new version of my model and the version presented in 
Chapter 2 are that: the Coupon C is determined such that a time 0, Junior Debt is priced at par; 
and every time there is the coupons’ payment the value of Asset VT jump down and the 
dynamic restart from (Vt – C). 
The first results is that: my cumulative DPs present a trend similar to those empirically found; 
and at the end of the period (after T = 10) these probabilities are coincident with the empirical 
data. 
Second, the average Asset Value in case of default is equal to 41.95 %, while the recovery rate 
(on average) is 51.08%. This latter value, however, is in line with the value empirically found 
in literature 51% - 52% (as above highlighted). 
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Third, yield to maturity for the senior bond is equal to 5.49%, while for the junior bond this 
rate is equal to 11.07%. Therefore, the credit spread for junior bond (5.07%) is in line with the 
value that is empirically found in literature (4.7%). 
Fourth, the probability that the Senior Bond is fully paid is 76.9%, while for the Junior Bond 
this probability is equal to 53.28%.  
The interesting thing, however, is that I capture these stylized fact with real ingredients . All 
parameters’ value are chosen using data found in a couple of empirical papers. 
In addition, when I change the value of  the grace period from 1 to 0.65 (equal to the average 
between the Us value and Swedish value) my DPS fit very well the empirical. 
In this latter case (hypothetical country), I demonstrate that the difference between my data 
and empirical data is due mainly to the fact that my model is built on US data while empirical 
data (cumulative default probabilities) are global. Indeed, in my base case the key parameter d 
(grace period) is set equal to 1 (that represent the US value), while empirical data are global 
data and it is demonstrate that in a couple of Country it is possible to have a liquidation in less 
than 1 year.  
I could assert that my model with coupons match very well empirical data. In particular when 
I consider the “hypothetical country”, varying the level of d (grace period).     
It is important, then, to point out that I made a couple of sensitivity analysis and the results are 
in line with expectations and with the results historically found in literature.  
Finally, If I adapt old models to this framework, I get, again, that: cumulative Dps are very 
different from empirical DPs; the recovery rate calculated empirically is equal to 52%, while 
in the hit and default model this parameter is equal to 83.8%; the yield spread is equal to 3.6% 
and it is very far from the 4.70% reported by the Lehman bond index.   
This happens, even if I consider an hit and default model with LCs. Indeed, I get a recovery 
rate equal to 67%, that is very different from the empirical value of 52%.  
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Therefore, I show again that old models are inefficient and not able to match empirical data. 
On the contrary, I could affirm that, with my approach, I am able to reproduce really well the 
real world and that it is crucial the combination of these two ingredients: the presence of the 
grace period and of coupons.   
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Appendix A – A Real Option Model with a Senior Coupon Bond 
 
A. Brief Introduction  
Here, I present a different adaption of my model in which I assume that the Senior Bond is the 
coupon bond. In this way, I want to show that the results found in chapter 3 do not depend on 
the hypothesis that the Junior Bond is the coupon bond.  
In other word, I try to demonstrate that it is fundamental the presence of coupons in the model 
and it is not important which bond is the zero coupon bond and which one is the coupon bond. 
The outcomes are in line with expectations and confirm that it is crucial the presence of 
coupons. Indeed, I get a recovery rate and a yield spreads very close to empirical value and 
my cumulative default probabilities follow the trend of data found empirically.  
 
A.1 Structural Model  
As pointed out above, I assume that the Senior Bond is a Coupon Bond, while the Junior Bond 
is a Zero Coupon Bond. This setting could replicate a real situation in which a firm has a bank 
debt with coupons or a plain vanilla bond, while junior debt is a debt versus stakeholders.  
The Coupon C is determined such that a time 0, Senior Debt is priced at par: 
 
PSB  = (γ) * F               (a.1) 
 
A.2 The valuation of corporate securities  
Here, I show the new pay-off of equityholders and of bondholders and I point out that, when 
there is liquidation, senior bondholders receive the present value of coupons (Σ Couponst) and 
this value include the accrued interest.      
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A.2.1 Equity Value 
Also in this framework, in case of liquidation Equity holders, as residual claimants, do not 
receive anything. Therefore, if there is not liquidation, at debt maturity T, Equity holders 
receive the maximum between zero and the difference between the firm’s asset value VT and 
the face value of the total debt (F). The Equity holders pay-off is represented by this equation: 
 
S(VT , T , gtk) = max (VT  - F, 0)*1{θk> t} =         (a.2) 
 
At any time before the debt maturity, if bankruptcy hasn’t occurred, the value of Equity 
holders claim is given by: 
 
St (Vt , T , gtk) = e-r(T-t) EQt [max (VT  - F - coupon, 0)*1{θk> t}]      (a.3) 
 
A.2.2 Senior Debt 
The value of the senior debt (SD) is equal to:  
- face value plus PVC (present Value of Coupons) if the firm is not prematurely liquidated, 
and the asset value of the firm VT is greater than the face value of Debt plus the last 
coupon; 
- face value plus PVC (present Value of Coupons) if the firm is not prematurely liquidated, 
and the asset value of the firm VT is greater than the face value of Debt plus liquidation cost 
and last coupon; 
- VT – LC + PVC – last coupon if  the firm is not prematurely liquidated, and VT is smaller 
than the face value of SD plus liquidation cost and last coupon; 
- face value + Σ Couponst  if the firm is liquidated, and Vt is greater than the face value of SD 
plus liquidation cost; 
VT – F    if VT > F + Coupon and θk > T 
0            otherwise 
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- Vt – LC + Σ Couponst if the firm is liquidated, and Vt is less than the face value of SD plus 
liquidation cost.  
In summary, I define the possible values of SD, to be: 
 
 
SDt (Vt , T , gtK) =            
 
 
The expression (a.4) may be rewritten as: 
 
SDt (Vt,T,gtK) = EQt[(SD*e-r(T-t)+PVC)*1{θk>T}*1{VT≥F}]+EQt[(SD*e-r(T-t)+PVC)*1{θk>T}* 
*1{VT<F+c}*1{VT≥SD+LC+c}+EQt[((VT-LC-c)*e-r(T-t))+PVC)*1{θk>T}*1{VT<F+c}*1{VT<SD+LC]+Eqt[(SD 
+ Σ Coupt)*e-r(θk -t)*1{θk≤ T}*1{Vt ≥ SD+LC}] +EQt [(Vt – LC + Σ Coupt )*e-r(θk -t)*1{θk≤ T}*1{Vt < 
SD+LC}]                 (a.5) 
 
where:  
1) 1{VT ≥ SD + LC + c.} is an indicator function equal to 1 if VT is greater than SD + LC + last 
coupon, and equal to 0 otherwise;  
2) 1{VT < SD + LC + c.} is an indicator function equal to 1 if VT is smaller than SD + LC, and equal 
to 0 otherwise.  
 
A.2.3 Junior Debt 
The Value of the junior debt is equal to:  
- face value if the firm is not prematurely liquidated, and the asset value of the firm VT is 
bigger than the face value of TD plus the last coupon;  
SD + PVC  if VT ≥ F + coupon and θk > T 
SD + PVC  if VT < F + coupon, VT ≥ SD + LC + coupon and θk > T 
VT–LC+PVC– coup. if VT < F + coupon, VT < SD + LC + coupon and θk > T  
SD + Σ Coupt   if Vt ≥ SD + LC  and θk ≤ T   
Vt – LC + Σ Coupt if Vt < SD + LC and θk ≤ T              (a.4)
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- (VT – SD – LC – coupon) if the firm is not prematurely liquidated, and VT is smaller than 
the face value of Debt but greater than the face value of SD plus liquidation cost and last 
coupon;  
- 0 if the firm is not prematurely liquidated, and VT is smaller than the face value of SD plus 
liquidation cost and last coupon; 
- (Vt – SD – LC) if the firm is liquidated, and Vt is bigger than the face value of SD plus the 
liquidation cost and accrued interest;  
- 0 if the firm is liquidated, and Vt is smaller than the face value of SD plus the liquidation 
cost and accrued interest.  
In summary, I define the possible values of JD, to be: 
 
 
JDt (Vt , T , gtK) =                 
 
The expression (a.6) may be rewritten as: 
 
JDt(Vt,T,gtK) = EQt[((JD)*e-r(T-t))*1{θk> T}*1{VT≥ F + c}+EQt[((VT–SD–LC–coupon)*e-r(T-
t))*1{θk>T}*1{VT<F+coupon}*1{VT ≥ SD + LC + c}]+EQt[(Vt – SD – LC)*e-r(θk-t)*1{θk≤ T}*1{Vt ≥ SD + LC}] 
(a.7) 
In table a.1, I point out the payoffs given to the different stakeholders and computed 
analytically above from (a.3) to (a.7).    
 
 
 
 
JD         if VT≥F+coupon and θk > T 
(VT – SD – LC – coupon)        if VT<F+coupon, VT≥SD+LC+coupon and θk>T 
0          if VT<F+coupon, VT<SD+LC+coupon and θk>T    
(Vt – SD – LC)       if Vt ≥ SD + LC + a.c. and θk ≤ T 
0                                             if Vt < SD + LC + a.c. and θk ≤ T                (a.6)
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 Tab. a.1 – Payoffs 
 
PAYOFFS TO
VT ≥ F + Coupon 
and θk > T
VT < F + Coupon, VT ≥ 
SD+LC+coupon and θk > T
VT < F + Coupon, VT < 
SD+LC+coupon and θk > T
F ≥ Vt ≥ SD+LC+a.i. and θk 
≤ T
Vt < SD+LC+a.i. and θk ≤ T
EQUITYHOLDERS VT – F 0 0 0 0
SENIOR BONDHOLDERS SD + PVC SD + PVC VT – LC + PVC - couponT SD + Σ Coupt +a.i. Vt – LC + Σ Coupt
JUNIOR BONDHOLDERS JD (VT – SD – LC – couponT)  0 (Vt – SD – LC) 0
TOTAL VT + PVC (VT - LC) + (PVC -couponT) (VT - LC) + (PVC -couponT) Vt - LC + Σ Couponst + a.i. Vt - LC + Σ Couponst + a.i.
Bond repayment or Liquidation at the end (T) Liquidation before T
 
 
A.3 Benchmark  
I use, again, default probabilities over the time interval (0,T], the implied recovery rate RR = 
(1-LC)*Vl / F and the yield spread as parameter in order to test the consistency of my model.  
   
A.4 Numerical implementation 
I use, also in this case, a Monte-Carlo simulation approach that considers 150,000 sample 
paths for calculating bond prices, equity value, cumulative default probabilities, and recovery 
rate and the solution are stable up to the second digit.  
 
A.5 Parameters’ choice 
I assume that firm’s capital structure is constituted by ordinary stock, senior debt and junior 
debt. Both the obligations have a maturity of 10 years. Junior Debt is a Zero Coupon Bond, 
while Senior Debt is a Coupon Bond. 
I utilize the same real value used in Chapter 2 for the parameters present in the Model. The 
two main differences are: the Coupon C is determined such that a time 0, Senior Debt is 
priced at par; and every time there is the coupons’ payment the value of Asset VT jump down 
and the dynamic restart from (VT – C). 
Table a.2 report the parameters’choice. 
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Tab. a.2 – Parameters 
 
simulazioni zcb
Parameter Symbol Value Assumed
Time to Maturity T 10
Pre‐defined grace period d 1
Percentage of SD on Total Debt γ 0,5
Default free interest rate r 0,06
Volatility of the asset of the firm σ 0,29
Liquidation Cost LC 0,2
Threshold's parameter ω 0,85
Dividend yield δ 0
Initial Value of Assets V0 100
Leverage Ratio LR 0,657
Debt Face Value F 65,7
Debt Coupon rate i 0,06475
dt=0.01; dt 0,01
paths 150.000                
 
 
A.6 Results  
From table a.3 it is clear that the probability that the Senior Bond is fully paid is 79.28%, 
while for the Junior Bond this probability is equal to 58.87%.  
More details about default probabilities, recovery rate and yield spreads are pointed out from 
paragraph a.6.1 to paragraph a.6.4.  
Tab. a.3 – Some results 
 
Liquidation Cost 2,36%
Average V at the default 42,37%
Yield Senior 6,58%
Yield Junior 11,13%
Cumulative default pr at T 41,13%
Cumulative default pr before T 33,14%
Pr. Senior paid in full 79,28%
Pr. Junior paid in full 58,87%
Recovery Rate 51,59%  
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A.6.1 Cumulative DPS 
Again, I test my model, matching my cumulative default probabilities with the cumulative 
DPs observed in literature (Moody’s, 2011).  
From this comparison, it is evident that my DPs are not very far from empirical data and that 
at T = 10 these probabilities are very close. The light difference still depends on the fact that I 
set my model on US market, while Moody’s data are global data. In particular, it is important 
to point out that my d (grace period) is equal to 1 as in US, but we don’t have any “global” 
reference. 
 
Figure a.1 – Cumulative default probabilities   
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A.6.2 Recovery Rate 
The average Asset Value in case of default is equal to 42.4%, while the recovery rate (on 
average) is 51.59%. This value is in line with the value empirically found in literature 51% - 
52% (as above highlighted). 
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A.6.3 Yield Spread 
I find that the yield to maturity for the senior bond is equal to 6.58%, while for the junior bond 
this rate is equal to 11.13%. Therefore, the credit spread for junior bond (5.13%) is not very 
far / is in line with the value that is empirically found in literature (4.7%). 
 
A.6.4 Empirical cumulative DPs vs. old models 
I show below a graph where: 
- The blue line represents my DPs; 
-  The violet line represents the DPs computed through an adaption of my model in which I 
assume that the grace period is equal to 0.01 (such as in old models), there aren’t 
Liquidation costs; 
- The red line represents empirical data. 
 
Figure a.2 – Cumulative default probabilities   
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Analyzing the figure, I could point out that the adaption of old models (g = 0.01 with two type 
of debt, of which one Junior with coupons) give back results very different from Moody’s 
data.  
This latter fact is confirmed if I compare the recovery rate and yield spread computed through 
the hit and default model with those empirically found. Indeed, the recovery rate calculated 
empirically is equal to 52%, while in the hit and default model this parameter is equal to 
83.7%; the yield spread is equal to 0.4% and it is very far from the 4.70% reported by the 
Lehman bond index.   
Even if I consider an hit and default models with LC, I have the same results. Indeed, I get a 
recovery rate equal to 67%, that is very different from the empirical value of 52%; 
Also in this case, I could affirm that old models are not able to outline the real world. 
 
A.7 Hypothetical country 
Also in this appendix, I present an hypothetical case, in which I change only one variable of 
my model and the coupon rate in order to satisfy the hypothesis that the senior debt is priced 
at par. In practice, I consider a grace period g = 0.65 (versus 1.0 in the base case), that is more 
or less in line with the average between the grace period found for US and the grace period 
found for Sweden.    
The outcomes are very satisfying and they match empirical data very well.  
These results, once again, confirm that the difference between my data and empirical data is 
due mainly to the fact that my model is built on US data and for that I use a grace period equal 
to 1, while empirical data (cumulative default probabilities) are global.  
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Figure a.3 – Cumulative default probabilities   
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A.8 Sensitivity analysis  
I now consider how my results are sensitive to the choices of my parameters. I start from the 
base case, and then change various parameter choices in order to study the impact of these 
parameters on the asset value, on recovery rate and on the DPs.  
The results are in line with the expectations and with the sensitivity analysis reported in 
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3.  
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A.8.1 Grace period (d) 
 
Figure a.4  – Sensitivity analysis: grace period 
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Figure a.5  – Sensitivity analysis: grace period 
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Figure a.6  – Sensitivity analysis: grace period 
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A.8.2 Volatility (sigma) 
 
Figure a.7 – Sensitivity analysis: volatility 
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Figure a.8 – Sensitivity analysis: volatility  
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Figure a.9 – Sensitivity analysis: volatility 
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A.8.3 The percentage of Senior Bond on the Total Debt 
 
Figure a.10 – Sensitivity analysis: The percentage of Senior Bond on the Total Debt 
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Figure a.11 – Sensitivity analysis: The percentage of Senior Bond on the Total Debt  
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Figure a.12 – Sensitivity analysis: The percentage of Senior Bond on the Total Debt  
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A.8.4 Dividend yield (delta) 
 
Figure a.13 – Sensitivity analysis: dividend yield 
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Figure a.14 - Sensitivity analysis: dividend yield 
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Figure a.15 – Sensitivity analysis: dividend yield 
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A.8.5 Liquidation Costs  
 
Figure a.16 – Sensitivity analysis: liquidation cost 
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Figure a.17 – Sensitivity analysis: liquidation cost  
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A.8.6 Leverage Ratio 
 
Figure a.18 – Sensitivity analysis: leverage ratio 
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Figure a.19 – Sensitivity analysis: leverage ratio 
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Figure a.20 – Sensitivity analysis: leverage ratio 
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A.8.7 Threshold's parameter (Omega) 
 
Figure a.21 – Sensitivity analysis: Threshold's parameter 
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Figure a.22 – Sensitivity analysis: Threshold's parameter 
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Figure a.23 – Sensitivity analysis: Threshold's parameter 
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A.8.8 Free-risk Rate (r)  
 
Figure a.24 – Sensitivity analysis: Threshold's parameter 
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Figure a.25 – Sensitivity analysis: Threshold's parameter 
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Figure a.26 – Sensitivity analysis: Threshold's parameter 
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A.9 Conclusion 
The results of this Appendix are in line with the results of Chapter 3. Therefore, I am sure that 
the reliability (or capacity of matching cumulative default probabilities, recovery rate and 
yield spread) of my model does not depend on the fact that the junior debt is a coupon bond. 
As pointed out above, the combination of the presence of coupons and of the grace period 
represents the crucial aspect of my model.   
Therefore, I can assert that my framework fit really well empirical data because it is more 
compliance with reality than old models. 
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